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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE INFORMATION ACQUISITION
OF DOUBT-PRONE DECISION MAKERS
Larbi Alaoui
Alvaro Sandroni
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to
observe the eventual outcome. In these instances, individuals often prefer to avoid
observing the outcome. The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected
Utility model cannot accommodate these cases, since it does not distinguish between
lotteries for which outcomes are observed by the agent and lotteries for which they
are not. I develop an axiomatic model that admits preferences for observing the
outcome or remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connection
between the agent’s attitude towards risk, doubt, and what I refer to as ’optimism’.
This framework accommodates a wide array of field and experimental observations
that violate the vNM model, and that may not seem related, prima facie. For
instance, this framework accommodates self-handicapping, in which an agent chooses
to impair his own performance. Unlike other frameworks, this model accommodates
self-handicapping without using notions of self-deception, cognitive dissonance and
belief manipulation. It also admits a status quo bias without having recourse to
framing effects or reference points. Furthermore, this framework accommodates
behavior associated with anticipated regret, the Allais paradox and preferences for
smaller menus, which are all difficult to reconcile with the vNM framework. In
financial settings, this model accommodates a safe allocation bias, in which agents
choose neither to buy nor short sell an asset for an interval of prices; this behavior
has so far been explained using ambiguity aversion, which this model does not allow.
Recently, experiments have been conducted in which dictators in dictator games
who seem to exhibit preferences for fairness often switch to the selfish choice if
they can avoid observing the recipients allocation. While the empirical findings of
v
these experiments are difficult to reconcile either with models of Expected Utility
or models of fairness, they fit the predictions of this model well. This framework
accommodates all the well-known observations mentioned here and others described
in the papers with a single, natural extension of the standard vNM model, and using
the same assumption on preferences throughout.
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Preface
This dissertation consists of two related chapters that are designed to stand alone.
In theory, they could be read independently, in either order. The first chapter,
titled ‘The value of useless information’, has a more theoretical emphasis and delves
deeper into the origin of the decision maker’s preferences, although it does consider
applications. The second chapter, titled ‘Information aversion and the preservation
of self-image’, assumes the same type of individual preferences, and focuses on a
specific set of applications, namely those in which the agent’s self-image plays an
important role in his choices. There is a theoretical component to this second chapter
as well, even though it is mainly applications based.
This project began with my interest in a set of economically relevant situations
that had not been formally analyzed. In particular, there are a number of situations
in which individuals care about outcomes that they might never actually observe.
This notion of having preferences over something that might never be observed is
not one that is usually discussed in standard economics. In fact economic models,
including the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model,
usually do not distinguish between preferences when outcomes are eventually ob-
served and when they are not. It did not appear that there were tools for analyzing
this type of scenario. This does not mean that economic models do not contain
setups in which agents care about outcomes they might never see; for instance, a
very common Overlapping Generations Model with altruism effectively assumes that
agents care about their descendants, whose consumption occurs after their death.
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Rather, my motivation was that agents are restricted in the type of preferences they
are allowed to express in these cases. That is, the standard vNM model (for exam-
ple) does not distinguish between lotteries for which the outcomes are observed by
the agent and lotteries for which they are not. Hence, in the case where agents have
a choice between observing and never observing an outcome, they must be indiffer-
ent. Here, I take a formal axiomatic approach that builds on the vNM model, with
the intention of characterizing more general preferences that admit preferences for
observing an outcome or for remaining in doubt.
The original title of the project, now the title of the first chapter, ‘The value of
useless information’, comes from the type of leading examples I initially considered.
My leading examples were that patrons of local restaurant often do not wish to enter
the kitchen, or that a significant percentage of people do not want to know whether
the clothes they buy have been made by children. For those who are unwilling to
change their behavior conditional on the information they receive, it may seem that
this information is non-instrumental, and in that sense useless. But this information
could in fact influence some individuals’ behavior, and in most of the cases that I
consider, choices can change radically depending on the information people receive.
This makes the individual choice to avoid ever observing an outcome even more
puzzling, as this information is instrumental.
After analyzing this model (henceforth VUI, for ‘Value of Useless Information’) in
more depth, it became clear that it could accommodate many field and experimental
observations that appear to violate the standard vNM model, and that might not
appear related. Distinct models have been developed to accommodate some of these
different empirical results that seem inconsistent with the standard vNM framework,
but these models differ significantly from the vNM framework and from each other.
Here, I show that a simple and natural extension of the vNM model can accommodate
many behavioral patterns in what I think is a plausible way, using axioms that are
very close to the standard vNM axioms. In addition, I show that these patterns are
2
consistent with doubt-proneness. What I mean by this term is that agents exhibit
a preference for not observing the resolution of uncertainty, and in that sense, they
have a preference for remaining in doubt. To give a sense of the type of the seemingly
disparate behavioral patterns that this model can accommodate, I list a few examples
below, namely self-deception, the status quo bias, and anticipated regret:
(i) Self-deception. Economic models of self-image typically assume a technology
for belief manipulation or temporal inconsistency. The notion of self-deception
requires the agent to have a paradoxical ability to lie to himself. However,
I show that an agent who is not temporally inconsistent and does not have
manipulable beliefs may still act as if he were deceiving himself. One instance
is self-handicapping, in which an individual deliberately reduces his chances of
succeeding at a task. This result is consistent with doubt-proneness; an agent
makes less effort to obtain a coarser signal of his decision making ability. This
reasoning is essentially a formalization of the colloquial ‘fear of failure’.
(ii) Status quo bias. The status quo bias refers to individuals’ tendency to prefer
their current endowment to other alternatives. This bias cannot be explained
using the vNM model, and is one of the reasons cited by Kahneman, Knetch
and Thaler (1991) for suggesting “a revised version of preference theory that
would assign a special role to the status quo.” I show that the VUI framework
also admits a status quo bias, without having recourse to a notion of reference
points, gains or losses. This bias occurs when inaction is a less informative
indicator of the agent’s ability than other actions. In some settings, however,
the VUI framework predicts a bias towards the safe allocation, rather than
a bias towards the status quo allocation. For example, I consider a financial
market setting, and show that an agent will be biased towards the safe ‘zero
position’, as implied by models of ambiguity aversion.
(iii) Anticipated regret. In Zeelenberg’s (1999) Dutch lottery example, subjects in
3
two groups have the choice between buying a lottery ticket and keeping their
money. Agents in the ‘feedback’ group observe the result of the lottery ticket
even if they do not buy it, and agents in the ‘no-feedback’ group only observe
the result if they buy the ticket. Studies show that a higher percentage of
individuals in the feedback group purchase the lottery than in the no-feedback
group. This evidence is difficult to reconcile with utility theory, and is generally
associated with anticipated regret. I show that this behavior is consistent with
the VUI model.
The VUI model also accommodates other results that have motivated models
of anticipated regret, disappointment aversion and prospect theory. A well-
known instance is the variant of the Allais paradox known as the common
ratio effect.1 The same individuals who prefer $200 with probability 1 to $300
with probability 4/5 also often prefer $300 with probability 1/2 to $200 with
probability 3/5. While this empirical finding is a clear violation of the standard
vNM model, it is consistent with the VUI framework.
In addition to these examples, the VUI model also applies to other economic
environments. In a political economy setting, voters deliberately remain ignorant,
and as the importance of the relevant issue increases, their incentive to acquire in-
formation decreases. This model therefore serves as a unifying axiomatic foundation
for a wide array of observed patterns of behavior. Of course, my aim is not to have
this model replace all other explanations. There is, for example, much evidence
and little debate that people do lie to themselves, and have myriad ways of holding
contradictory ideas at once. There are models that capture this behavior well. My
intention, rather, is to demonstrate that a wide range of behavior that may have
seemed inconsistent with the standard vNM model can be accommodated with a
simple extension of the standard vNM Expected Utility framework.
1This example is introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The numbers I use are from
Gul (1998).
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Chapter 1
The value of useless information
Abstract
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether
or not to observe the eventual outcome. In these instances, individuals of-
ten prefer to avoid observing the outcome. The standard von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model cannot accommodate these
cases, since it does not distinguish between lotteries for which outcomes
are observed by the agent and lotteries for which they are not. I develop
an axiomatic model that admits preferences for observing the outcome
or remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connection
between the agent’s attitude towards risk, doubt, and what I refer to as
‘optimism’.
This framework accommodates a wide array of field and experimen-
tal observations that violate the vNM model, and that may not seem
related, prima facie. For instance, this framework accommodates self-
handicapping, in which an agent chooses to impair his own performance.
It also admits a status quo bias, without having recourse to framing ef-
fects. In a political economy setting, a voter avoids free information if
he believes other voters will do the same.
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1.1 Introduction
Models of decision making under uncertainty usually assume that the agents ex-
pect to eventually observe the resolution of uncertainty. However, there are many
situations in which individuals can choose to avoid finding out which outcome has
occurred. In these cases, individuals often decide not to observe the resolution of
uncertainty. Consider the classic example of genetic diseases. As Pinker (2007)
discusses, “the children of parents with Huntington’s disease [HD] usually refuse to
take the test that would tell them whether they carry the gene for it.” HD is a
neurodegenerative disease with severe physical and cognitive symptoms. It reduces
life expectancy significantly, and there is currently no known cure. A person can
take a predictive test to determine whether he himself will develop HD. A prenatal
test can also be done to determine whether his unborn child will have the disease as
well.1 In an experimental study, Adam et al. (1993) find low demand for prenatal
testing for HD. This is supported by a number of other studies as well, and Simpson
et al. (2002) find that the demand for prenatal testing is significantly lower than the
demand for predictive tests. That is, individuals who are willing to know their own
HD status are often unwilling to find out their unborn child’s status. Observing the
result is an important decision, since the prenatal test is done at a stage in which
parents can still terminate the pregnancy. As for parents who do not consider preg-
nancy termination to be an option, the information could still impact the way they
decide to raise their child. For example, if they know that their child will develop
HD, they might choose to prepare him psychologically for the difficult choices he
will have to make in the future.
It may seem puzzling that some parents prefer to avoid the test. It may appear
particularly surprising that a person who prefers to be certain of his own HD status
now rather than later would also choose not to find out whether his unborn child will
1An affected individual has a 50% chance of passing the disease to each child. The average age
of onsets varies between ages 35 and 55. See Tyler et al. (1990) for details.
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develop the disease.2 But note that the average age of onset for HD is high enough
that the subjects who do not see the result of the prenatal test may never find
out whether their children are affected. That is, while choosing the predictive test
mostly reveals a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, choosing (or refusing)
the prenatal test mainly reveals a preference for never observing the outcome of a
lottery. It is precisely this type of preference on which this paper focuses.3
The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model cannot
accommodate preferences for remaining in doubt, since it does not make a distinction
between lotteries for which the final outcomes are observed and lotteries for which
they are not.4 Redefining the outcome space to include whether the prize is observed
does not resolve the issue.5 In this paper, I modify the basic axioms of the vNM
framework to develop a model that admits strict preferences for remaining in doubt or
for observing the outcome. This model is a natural extension of the vNM framework,
but it can accommodate a wide array of field and experimental observations that are
considered incompatible with the vNM model, including self-handicapping and the
status quo bias.
1.1.1 Framework
An agent has primitive preferences over general lotteries that lead either to outcomes
that he observes or to lotteries that never resolve, from his frame of reference.6 This
2The prenatal test is not costless, as the procedure does involve a small chance of miscarriage.
However, this cost appears small compared to the severity of the disease.
3In particular, this paper does not consider other factors that are present in the HD example,
such as parents’ concern that their child will be treated differently if it is known that he has HD,
as discussed in Simpson (2002).
4The term observation is defined as learning what the outcome is. This model does not take
into account a possible disutility from the graphical nature of the observation itself.
5See appendix for a discussion on the problem with redefining the outcome space to include the
observation.
6Throughout this paper, probabilities are taken to be objective. With subjective probabilities,
there are cases in which it may seem more natural to interpret the preferences as state-dependent.
For instance, if a person has an intrinsic preference over his ability but is unsure of his type, it is
unclear whether ability is better viewed as a state of the world or a consequence.
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is a richer domain of lotteries than in the standard vNM case. If the agent receives
a lottery that never resolves then he knows that he will not observe the outcome,
and his terminal prize is the lottery itself. I apply the three standard vNM axioms
on this expanded domain; that is, weak order, continuity and independence hold. I
also assume that the agent is indifferent between observing a specific outcome and
receiving an unresolved lottery that places probability one on that same outcome,
since he is certain of the outcome’s occurrence. The observation itself has no effect on
the value of the outcome in this model. This property restricts the agent’s allowable
preferences over unresolved lotteries, as I demonstrate in section 2.
I obtain a representation theorem that separates the agent’s risk-attitude over
lotteries whose outcomes he observes from his risk attitude over unresolved lotteries.
While this representation theorem suffices for most of the analysis, I also consider a
second representation in a two-period setting in which the agent may learn ‘early’ or
‘late’ whether or not a lottery will resolve. His preferences over unresolved lotteries
are allowed to change over time. In contrast, his preferences over lotteries that
resolve do not change over time, as this model does not aim to capture a notion of
anxiety.
Using the first (static) representation, I explore the connection between risk-
aversion, doubt-proneness (a preference to avoid observing the outcome), and a new
notion of optimism over unresolved lotteries, which I formally define. Intuitively, an
optimistic agent prefers more ‘scrambled’ information. I show that an agent who is
both doubt-prone and risk-averse over the unresolved lotteries can be neither opti-
mistic nor pessimistic . In addition, his utility function associated with unresolved
lotteries must be more concave than his utility function associated with lotteries
whose outcome he observes. If an agent exhibits optimism over unresolved lotteries
has the same utility function for both lotteries that resolve and lotteries that do not,
then he must be doubt-prone.
Restricting attention only to preferences over purely unresolved lotteries, this
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model does not assume that these preferences obey the independence axiom. Instead,
I assume the Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) axioms, for reasons discussed in section
3. As there exists an accepted notion of optimism (Quiggin (1982)) in an RDU
setting, it is of interest to formally relate RDU optimism to this paper’s definition
of optimism. RDU optimism essentially corresponds to a notion of overweighing the
probabilities over the better outcomes. I show that my definition of optimism is
equivalent to RDU optimism, if it holds everywhere. In that sense, it serves as a
new axiom for RDU optimism.
1.1.2 Applications
The model presented here can accommodate seemingly unrelated behavioral patterns
that are inconsistent with the standard vNM model, and that have motivated frame-
works that are significantly different. Two important examples are self-handicapping
and the status quo bias. In this analysis, I assume throughout that the agent is
doubt-prone, but I do not allow him to be optimistic (or pessimistic) in his beliefs.
Consider first self-handicapping, in which individuals choose to reduce their
chances of succeeding at a task. As discussed in Benabou and Tirole (2002), people
may “choose to remain ignorant about their own abilities, and [...] they sometimes
deliberately impair their own performance or choose overambitious tasks in which
they are sure to fail (self-handicapping).” This behavior has been studied extensively,
and seems difficult to reconcile with the standard Expected Utility theory.7 For that
reason, models that study self-handicapping make a substantial departure from the
standard vNM assumptions. A number of models follow Akerlof and Dickens’ (1982)
approach of endowing agents with manipulable beliefs or selective memory. Alter-
natively, Carillo and Mariotti (2000) consider a model of temporal-inconsistency, in
which a game is played between the selves, and Benabou and Tirole (2002) use both
7Berglass and Jones (1978) conduct an experiment in which they find that males take
performance-inhibiting drugs, and argue that they do so precisely because it interferes with their
performance.
9
manipulable beliefs and time-inconsistent agents.8
The frameworks mentioned above capture a notion of self-deception, which in-
volves either a hard-wired form of selective memory (or perhaps a rule of thumb),
or some form of conflict between distinct selves. These models are often not axiom-
atized. In contrast, this model simply extends the vNM framework and does not
allow agents to manipulate their beliefs or to have access to any other means for
deceiving themselves.9 Yet it still accommodates the decision to self-handicap, as is
shown in section 4. Intuitively, a doubt-prone agent prefers doing worse in a task if
this allows him to avoid information concerning his own ability. This is essentially
a formalization of the colloquial ‘fear of failure’; an agent exerts less effort so as to
obtain a coarser signal.
This model can also accommodate a status quo bias. The status quo bias refers to
the well-known tendency people have for preferring their current endowment to other
alternatives. This phenomenon is often seen as a behavioral anomaly that cannot
be explained using the vNM model. On the other hand, it can be accommodated
using loss aversion, which refers to the agent being more averse to avoiding a loss
than to making a gain (Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1991)). The status quo bias
is therefore an immediate consequence of the agent taking the status quo to be the
reference point for gains versus losses. The vNM model does not allow an agent
to evaluate a bundle differently based on whether it is a gain or a loss, and hence
cannot accommodate a status quo bias. Arguably, this is an important systematic
8See also Compte and Postlewaite (2004), who focus on the positive welfare implications of hav-
ing a degree of selective memory (assuming such technology exists) in the case where performance
depends on emotions. Benabou (2008) and Benabou and Tirole (2006a, 2007) explore further
implications of belief manipulation, particularly in political economy settings, in which multiple
equilibria emerge. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) treat a general-equilbrium model in which
beliefs are essentially choice variables in the first period; an agent manipulates his beliefs about
the future to maximize his felicity, which depends on future utility flow. Caplin and Leahy (2001)
present an axiomatic model where agents have ‘anticipatory feelings’ prior to resolution of uncer-
tainty, which may lead to time inconsistency. Koszegi (2006) considers an application of Caplin
and Leahy (2001). Wu (1999) presents a model of anxiety.
9The notion of optimism can perhaps be seen as a form of belief manipulation, which is why I
do not allow agents to be optimistic in this part of the analysis.
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violation of the vNM model, and is one of the reasons cited by Kahneman, Knetch
and Thaler (1991) for suggesting “a revised version of preference theory that would
assign a special role to the status quo.”
This model does not make use of a notion of reference points or of relative gains
and losses.10 In the cases where the choices also have an informational component
on the agent’s ability to perform a task well, a doubt-prone agent has incentive to
choose the bundle that is less informative. This leads to a status quo bias when
it is reasonable to assume that maintaining the status quo is a less informative
indicator of the agent’s ability than other actions. Since this model does not resort
to reference points, there is no arbitrariness in defining what constitutes a gain and
what constitutes a loss. The bias of a doubt-prone agent is always towards the
least-informative signal of his ability. In instances where the status quo provides the
most informative signal, the bias would be against the status quo. For example, an
individual could have incentive to change activities frequently rather than obtaining
a sharp signal of his ability in one particular field.
This framework admits other instances of seemingly paradoxical behavior. In
one example, an individual pays a firm to invest for him even though he does not
expect that firm to have superior expertise. In other words, the agent’s utility not
only depends on the outcome, but also on who makes the decision. This result is
not due to a cost of effort, but rather to the amount of information acquired by the
decision maker. This framework can also be used in a political economy setting, as
there are many government decisions that are never observed by voters. As shown
in section 3, voters may have strong incentives to remain ignorant over these issues,
even if information is free. This is in line with the well-known observation that
there has been a consistently high level of political ignorance amongst voters in the
U.S. (see Bartels (1996) for details). This model suggests that if voters care more
about policies that they may never observe, then they have less incentive to acquire
10There are, however, examples of the status quo bias for which this model does not seem to
provide as natural an explanation as does loss-aversion.
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information. Finally, this framework also accommodates behavior associated with
anticipated regret, including preferences for smaller menus and the Allais paradox.
This analysis is outside the scope of the paper, and is instead conducted in chapter
2 of the dissertation.11
1.1.3 Relation to the literature
The approach used in this paper is related to, but distinct from, the recursive ex-
pected Utility (REU) framework introduced by Kreps and Porteus (1978), and ex-
tended by Epstein and Zin (1989), Segal (1990) and Grant, Kajii and Polak (1998,
2000).12 These earlier contribution address the issue of temporal resolution, in which
an agent has a preference for knowing now versus knowing later. While the REU
framework treats the issue of the timing of the resolution, this paper treats the case
of no resolution. Simply adding a ‘never’ stage to the REU space does not yield an
equivalent representation. To demonstrate this point, I place the agent in a two-stage
model (in section 5), but do not allow the agent to have preferences over temporal
resolution. The agent may, however, change his preferences over unresolved lotteries
over time. For instance, he may prefer to avoid information in the early stage, but
be curious in the later stage. In addition to the formal differences between the two
frameworks, there are also interpretational ones. The REU model captures a notion
of ‘anxiety’ (wanting to know sooner or later) which is distinct from the notion of
doubt-proneness (not wanting to know at all) addressed here.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives
the representation theorem. Section 3 defines optimism and doubt-proneness, and
discusses the connection between these two properties and risk-aversion. Section
11See Bell (1982), Loomes and Sugden (1982), and Sarver (2008) for theoretical models of antic-
ipated regret. See Zeelenberg (1999) for a review.
12Grant, Kajii and Polak (1998) focus on preferences for early resolution of uncertainty, and
Dillenberger (2008) considers preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty. Selden’s (1978)
framework is also closely related to the REU model.
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4 presents applications of this model. Section 5 relaxes the main independence
axiom of the framework and introduces an axiom that allows different classes of
models to incorporate outcomes that are never observed. In addition, it presents a
representation theorem for a two-period setting. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
in the appendix.
1.2 Model and Representation Theorem
This section derives a representation theorem, which I then extend in section 5. I
use the following objects. Let Z = [z, z̄] ⊂ < be the outcome space, an let L0 be
the set of simple probability measures on Z. For f = (z1, p1; z2, p2; ...; zm, pm) ∈ L0,
zi occurs with probability pi. I use the notation f(zi) to mean the probability pi
(in lottery f) that zi occurs. Let L1 be the set of simple lotteries over Z ∪ L0.
For X ∈ L1, I use the notation X = (z1, qI1 ; ...; zn, qIn; f1, qN1 ; ...; fm, qNm). Here, zi
occurs with probability qIi , and lottery fj occurs with probability q
N
j . Note that
n∑
i=1
qIi +
m∑
i=1
qNi = 1. The reason for using this notation, rather than the simpler
enumeration q1, q2, ..., qn is explained shortly. Let  denotes the agent’s preferences
over L1, and , ∼ are defined in the usual manner. Assume the agent’s preferences
are monotone.
For any X = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m), the agent expects
to observe the outcome of the first-stage lottery. He knows, for instance, that with
probability qIi , outcome zi occurs, and furthermore he knows that he will observe it.
Similarly, he knows that with probability qNi , lottery fi occurs. But while he does
observe that he is now faced with lottery fi, he does not observe the outcome of fi.
I refer to lottery fi as an ‘unresolved’ lottery. I also use the notation q
I
i and q
N
i to
distinguish between the probabilities that lead to prizes where the agent is informed
of the outcome (since he directly observes which z occurs), and the probabilities
that lead to prizes where he is not (since he only observes the ensuing lottery). The
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X
f1
qI2
p1
1− p1
z1
z3
z4
qN1 = 1− qI1 − qI2
qI1 z2
Figure 1.1: Lottery X = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; f1, q
N
1 ), where f1 = (z3, p1; z4, 1− p1)
superscript I in qIi stands for ‘Informed’, and N in q
N
i for ‘Not informed’ (see figure
1).
Denote the degenerate one-stage lottery that leads to zi ∈ Z with certainty
δzi = (zi, 1) ∈ L0. The degenerate lottery that leads to fi ∈ L0 with certainty is
denoted δfi = (fi, 1) ∈ L1. Note that all lotteries of form X = f , where f ∈ L0,
are purely resolved (or ‘informed’) lotteries, in the sense that the agent expects to
observe whatever outcome occurs. Similarly, all lotteries of form X = δf , where
f ∈ L0, are purely unresolved lotteries. With slight abuse, the notation f  f ′ (or
δf  δf ′) is used, where f, f ′ ∈ L0. In addition, f  δf (or δf  f) indicates that
the agent prefers (not) to observe the outcome of lottery f than to remain in doubt.
1.2.1 General axioms
The following certainty axiom A.1 is assumed throughout:
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AXIOM A.1 (Certainty): Take any zi ∈ Z, and let X = δzi = (zi, 1) and
X ′ = (δzi , 1). Then X ∼ X ′.
The certainty axiom A.1 concerns the case in which an agent is certain that an
outcome zi occurs. In that case, it makes no difference whether he is presented with
a resolved lottery that leads to zi for sure or an unresolved lottery that leads to zi for
sure. He is indifferent between the two lotteries. Hence axiom A.1 does not allow
the agent to have a preference for being informed of something that he already knows
for sure. This simple axiom provides a formal link between the agent’s preferences
over resolved lotteries and his preferences over unresolved lotteries. The following
three axioms are standard.
AXIOM A.2 (Weak Order):  is complete and transitive.
AXIOM A.3 (Continuity):  is continuous in the weak convergence topology.
That is, for each X ∈ L1, the sets {X ′ ∈ L1 : X ′  X} and {X ′ ∈ L1 : X  X ′} are
both closed in the weak convergence topology.
AXIOM A.4 (Independence): For all X, Y, Z ∈ L1 and α ∈ (0, 1], X  Y implies
αX + (1− α)Z  αY + (1− α)Z.
Focusing on axiom A.4, it is noteworthy that the agent’s preferences  are on
a richer space than in the standard framework. The independence axiom in the
standard vNM model is taken on preferences over lotteries over outcomes, since all
lotteries lead to outcomes that are eventually observed. In this paper, the agent’s
prize is not always an outcome zi, and can instead be an unresolved lottery fi.
By assumption A.4, however, there is no axiomatic difference between receiving an
outcome zi as a prize and obtaining an unresolved lottery fi as a prize. Under this
approach, the rationale for using the independence axiom in the standard model
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holds in this case as well. Since this section aims to depart as little as possible from
the vNM Expected Utility model, I assume the independence axiom A.4 throughout.
I relax this assumption in section 5 and replace it with a weaker axiom.
Axioms A.1 through A.4 suffice for this model to subsume the standard vNM
representation for preferences over outcomes that the agent eventually observes.
That is, suppose we focus on lotteries of form X = f , i.e. lotteries that lead to
outcomes. Then all the standard vNM axioms over these lotteries hold, and the EU
representation follows directly. These axioms are not sufficient, however, to charac-
terize the agent’s preferences over lotteries that do not resolve. If, for instance, the
agent receives a lottery X = δf , it is unclear what his ‘perception’ of unresolved lot-
tery f is. The next step, therefore, is to consider axioms that allow us to characterize
the agent’s preferences over these ‘purely’ unresolved lotteries of form X = δf . As
there is a natural isomorphism between lotteries of form X = δf ∈ L1 and one-stage
lotteries in L0, define the preference relation N in the following way:
Definition of N . For any fN , f ′N ∈ L0, f N f ′ if δf  δf ′ .
Define N and ∼N in the usual way. I do not assume independence over the
preference relation N , for the following reason. Suppose that an agent is given
a choice between three lottery tickets. The first ticket consists of a lottery f =
($1000, 1/3; $400, 1/3; $0, 1/3). With probability 1/3, the ticket yields $1000, with
probability 1/3 it yields $400, and it yields 0 otherwise. The second ticket consists
of lottery f ′ = ($1000, 1/2; $0, 1/2) and the third ticket consists of f ′′ = ($400, 1) =
δ400, which yields $400 for certain. In addition, suppose that the agent does not
purchase the ticket for himself, but for a charitable organization that he holds in
high esteem.
It is plausible that a risk-averse agent prefers the safe lottery δ400 to lottery f
′, if
he expects to observe the outcome of the lotteries (for instance, if the charity thanks
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him for his contribution of the quantity it receives). But it may also be the case
that the same agent has different preferences and choose risky lottery f ′ over the
safe lottery δ400 (f
′ N δ400), if he donates the unresolved ticket to the charity and
does not expect to observe which outcome occurs. There is a 1/2 chance that the
charity has received $1000, and he does not expect to ever find out if it has received
$0. These preferences may be driven by a notion of ‘optimism’.
Now compare lotteries f to f ′, still for the case in which the agent does not
expect to observe the resolution of uncertainty. It is also plausible that the agent
prefers lottery f to f ′ (f N f ′): lottery f is less risky than lottery f ′, and at the
same time he still does not find out whether the charity has received $0:
($1000, 1/3; $400, 1/3; $0, 1/3) N ($1000, 1/2; $0, 1/2) N δ400.
These preferences appear reasonable, but they violate independence. In fact, they
violate the stronger axiom of betweenness, and so do not fall in the Dekel (1986)
class of preferences.13
This example illustrates that there are two distinct notions that play a role in
the agent’s preference over unresolved lotteries. The agent may be risk-averse over
unresolved lotteries, and this risk-aversion manifests itself in his comparison between
lottery f and the more risky lottery f ′. At the same time, he may be ‘optimistic’
that the good outcome has occurred if he does not observe the lottery, which affects
his assessment of lottery f ′, compared to the safe lottery δ400. A single utility
function v cannot capture both these notions, since risk-aversion and optimism do
not necessarily coincide, as in the previous example. However, both risk-aversion
and optimism are contributing factors to the agent’s preferences to remain in doubt.
I now assume the Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) axioms, which are general
enough to allow the previous example. The RDU representation allows for two
13Note that f = 23f
′+ 13δ400. This is a violation of independence (and betweenness) because the
following does not hold: f ′ N 23f ′+ 13δ400 N δ400. More specifically, this violates quasi-convexity.
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functions, v and w, the first that reweighs the outcomes (identically to the vNM
model), and the second reweighs the probabilities. I show, in the following section,
that an RDU representation captures a notion of risk and optimism that are suitable
to this model, even though my formal definition of optimism will be different from
the accepted RDU definition. I later consider conditions which force the function w
to be linear, essentially reducing the representation of N to a vNM representation.14
1.2.2 RDU representation for N .
The following notation is convenient for the RDU representation. For lottery f =
(z1, p1; ; ...; zm, pm) ∈ L0, the z′is are ordered from smallest to highest, i.e. zm >
... > z1. Recall that the agent’s preferences are monotone, which implies that
δzm N ... N δz1 . In addition, p∗i denotes the probability of reaching outcome
zi or an outcome that is weakly preferred to zi. That is, p
∗
i =
∑m
j=i pj. Note that for
the least-preferred outcome z1, p
∗
1 = 1. Probabilities p
∗
i are referred to here as ‘de-
cumulative’ probabilities. The RDU form, introduced by Quiggin (1982), is defined
in the following manner:15
Definition (RDU) Rank-dependent utility (RDU) holds if there exists a strictly
increasing continuous probability weighting function w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with w(0) = 0
and w(1) = 1 and a strictly increasing utility function v : Z → < such that for all
f, f ′ ∈ L0,
f N f ′ if and only if VRDU(f) > VRDU(f ′)
14The notion of ‘optimism’ may seem at odds with the previous claim that an agent who is not
allowed to manipulate his beliefs may still choose to ‘self-handicapping’. That is, one interpretation
of a rank-dependent utility representation is that the agent distorts the actual probability. For this
reason, In the analysis of self-handicapping (section 4), I do not allow the agent to be either
optimistic or pessimistic.
15See also Yaari (1987), and Diecidue and Wakker (2001) for a thorough discussion of RDU.
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where VRDU is defined to be: for all f = (z1, p1; z2, p2; ...; zm, pm),
VRDU(f) = v(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[v(zi)− v(zi−1)]w(p∗i )
Moreover, v is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Note that if the weighting function w is linear, then VRDU reduces to the standard
EU form.16 I now briefly discuss the axiomatic foundation of the RDU representa-
tion, in the context of this model. Suppose that
fα = (z1, p1; ...;α, pi; ...; zm, pm) N (z′1, p1; ...; β, pi; ...; z′m, pm) = f ′β
f ′κ = (z
′
1, p1; ...;κ, pi; ...; z
′
m, pm) N (z1, p1; ...; γ, pi; ...; zm, pm) = fγ
where α, β, γ, κ ∈ Z. Comparing lotteries fα and fγ, the only difference is in whether
α or γ is reached with probability pi. Since all the other outcomes are the same in
both lotteries and are reached with the same probabilities, the difference is in the
value of outcome α compared to the value of outcome γ (and similarly for f ′β,f
′
κ and
β, κ). In the comparison of fα N f ′β and f ′κ N fγ, all the probabilities of reaching
the (rank-preserved) outcomes are the same. For that reason, this model assumes
that the switch in preference is due to a difference in the value of outcomes α and
β relative to γ and κ, and not in the way the probabilities are aggregated. It is
precisely this property that RDU provides: if fα N f ′β and f ′κ N , fγ, and if N is
of the RDU form, then v(α)−v(β) ≥ v(γ)−v(κ). Note that this does not depend on
the choice of z′s and p′s, and so the following axiom, adapted from Wakker (1994),
must hold:
16This is not the most common form of RDU; this notation is taken from Abdellaoui (2002).
Given the rank-ordering above, the typical form would be VRDU =
∑n−1
i=1 [w(p
∗
i )−w(pi+1)∗]v(zi) +
w(pn)v(z
∗
n). It is easy to check that the two representations are identical.
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AXIOM N.RDU (Wakker tradeoff consistency for N):
Let fα = (z1, p1; ...;α, pi; ...; zm, pm), fγ = (z1, p1; ...; γ, pi; ...; zm, pm),
f ′β = (z
′
1, p1; ...; β, pi; ...; z
′
m, pm) and f
′
κ = (z
′
1, p1; ...;κ, pi; ...; z
′
m, pm). If:
fα N f ′β
f ′κ N fγ
then for any lotteries gα = (ẑ1, p̂1; ...;α, p̂i; ...; ẑm̂, p̂m̂), gγ = (ẑ1, p̂1; ...; γ, p̂i; ...; ẑm̂, p̂m̂),
g′β = (ẑ
′
1, p̂1; ...; β, p̂i; ...; ẑ
′
m̂, p̂m̂), g
′
κ = (ẑ
′
1, p̂1; ...;κ, pi; ...; ẑ
′
m̂, p̂m̂) such that gγ N g′κ,
it must be that gα N g′β.
Under this axiom, only the values of α,β,γ and κ are relevant to the ordering
of the agent’s preferences when all the probabilities of reaching all other outcomes
are the same across the four lotteries. In fact, as shown in Wakker (1994), this
axiom is sufficient, along with stochastic dominance and continuity, for the RDU
representation to hold. Using this result, the general representation theorem for 
is as follows:
Main Representation Theorem. Suppose axioms A.1 through A.4 and axiom
N.RDU hold. In addition, suppose stochastic dominance holds for N . Then there
exist strictly increasing, continuous and bounded functions u : Z → R, v : Z → R,
w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1, such that for all X, Y ∈ L1,
X  Y if and only if W (X) > W (Y )
where W is defined to be: for all X = ((z1, q
I
1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; ...; fm, q
N
m) ∈ L1,
W (X) =
n∑
i=1
qIi u(zi) +
m∑
j=1
qNj u
(
v−1
(
VRDU(f
N
j )
))
and
20
VRDU(f) = v(z1) +
∑m
h=2[v(zh)− v(zh−1)]w(p∗i ).
Moreover, u and v are unique up to positive affine transformation.
Note that u remains the utility function associated with the general lotteries (and
final outcomes). In addition, v is the utility function associated with unresolved
lotteries, and w is the probability weighting function associated with unresolved
lotteries. It is not immediately clear from this representation what doubt-proneness
implies, in terms of the shapes of the functions. The next section defines optimism,
and formally relates it to the accepted notion of optimism in an RDU setting. I then
connect doubt-proneness, risk-aversion, and this new notion of optimism.
1.3 Risk-aversion, doubt-proneness and optimism
In this section, I focus on the relationship between doubt-proneness and the shapes
of the functions u, v and w. I first define formally what optimism means in this
context. Returning to the charity example from the previous section, recall that
lottery f = ($1000, 1/3; $400, 1/3; $0, 1/3), lottery f ′ = ($1000, 1/2; $0, 1/2) and
lottery δ400 = ($400, 1). While f
′ N δ400, it is not the case that f ′ N af ′ + (1 +
a)δ400 N δ400 for all a, which the independence axiom would imply. In this example,
f = 2
3
f ′ + 1
3
δ400 N f ′.
The notion of optimism over unresolved lotteries I aim to capture allows the
agent prefer more ‘scrambled’ information, since it essentially allows him to form
a better assessment of these unresolved lotteries. Consider lottery δ400, in which
the agent is certain that the outcome is $400. Now suppose that it is mixed with
a lottery f̃ ′ = ($400 + δ, 1/2; $400 − ε), where f̃ ′ is chosen such that f̃ ′ ∼N f ′,
and ε is close to 0.17 Specifically, consider the mixture f̃ = 2/3 f ′ + 1/3 δ400 =
($400 + δ, 1/3; $400, 1/3; $400− ε, 1/3) (see figure 2). If independence were to hold,
17For δ to also be close to 0, $400 would have to be close to the certainty equivalent of the
unresolved lottery f ′ = ($1000, 1/2; $0, 1/2).
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Figure 1.2: Optimism.
then f ∼ f̃ . But I also allow f N f̃ , with the reasoning that the optimist agent
prefers knowing as little as as possible about the unresolved lottery. With lottery f ,
the optimist can form a more reassuring perception of the outcome, as it could be
much higher ($ 1000). With lottery f̃ , however, as ε becomes smaller and smaller,
it becomes less and less attractive to the optimist agent, as he is more and more
certain of the vicinity of the outcome. In brief, an optimist has a preference for
more ‘scrambled’ information. A pessimistic agent, on the other hand, prefers less
scrambled information, since knowing less would lead him to form a more negative
perception. I allow the agent to be optimist, pessimism or neutral (i.e. independence
may hold), but I assume that his preferences are preserved, given a specific mixture
a and specific probabilities. That is, if the agent prefers unresolved lottery f to f̃ ,
as in the example above, then this preference is preserved as ε becomes smaller. I re-
fer to this property, which I now generalize, as ‘information scrambling consistency’
(ISC).
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Definition (ISC) N satisfies information scrambling consistency (ISC) if:
let f = (z1, p1; ...; zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f
′ = (z1, p1; ...; z
′
i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn)
∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and case 1 : (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1) (case 2 : (zi, zi+1) ⊂
(z′i, z
′
i+1)). If, for some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (z′i, z′i+1):
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz,
then it must also be that:
af̃ + (1− a)δz̃ N af̃ ′ + (1− a)δz̃
for any
f̃ = (z̃1, p1; ...z̃i; pi; z̃i+1, pi+1; ...; z̃n, pn), f̃
′ = (z̃1, p1; ...z̃
′
i; pi; z̃
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; z̃n, pn) and
z̃ such that z̃ ∈ (z̃′i, z̃′i+1) ⊂ (z̃i, z̃i+1) (case 2 : z̃ ∈ (z̃i, z̃i+1) ⊂ (z̃′i, z̃′i+1)).
A preference for more scrambled information (optimism) corresponds to case 1,
i.e. preferring af + (1− a)δz  af ′+ (1− a)δz when (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1). Similarly,
a preference for less scrambled information (pessimism) corresponds to case 2. The
appeal of the RDU representation is that it satisfies the ISC property:
Theorem 2. Suppose that RDU holds for N . Then N satisfies ISC.
A local preference for more scrambled information, which I refer to as local op-
timism, does not correspond to the accepted RDU notion of optimism, analyzed
by Wakker (1994). I prove, however, that an agent has a global preference for
more scrambled information if and only if the weighting function w is concave, and
therefore corresponds to the Wakker notion of (global) optimism. Defining (global)
optimism:
Definition (Optimism) The preference relation N exhibits optimism if and only
if N always exhibits a preference for more scrambled information. That is, for any
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f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f
′ = (z1, p1; ...z
′
i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0
such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1), and for all a ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (zi, zi+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz.
The next theorem demonstrates that this definition of optimism corresponds to
the accepted RDU definition.
Theorem 3. Suppose that N satisfies RDU , and let w be the associated weighting
function. Then w is concave (convex) if and only if N exhibits optimism.
I now define doubt-proneness in the natural way.
Definition (Doubt-proneness)
• An agent is doubt-prone somewhereif there exists some f such that δf  f .
• An agent is doubt-prone everywhere if: (i) there exists no f ∈ L0 such that
f  δf and (ii) there exists some f such that δf  f .
An agent who prefers not to observe the resolution of some lottery than to observe
it is doubt-prone somewhere. An agent who (weakly, and strictly for one lottery)
prefers not to observe the outcome of any lottery is doubt-prone everywhere. Doubt-
aversion is defined in a similar manner. The next result below connects doubt-
proneness, the properties of the utility functions, and the properties of the probability
weighting function w(p). A similar result hold for doubt-aversion, and is deferred to
the appendix.
Theorem 4. Suppose that axioms A.1 through A.4 and the RDU axioms hold,
and let u and v be the utility functions associated with the resolved and unresolved
lotteries, respectively, and w be the decision weight associated with the unresolved
lotteries. In addition, suppose that u and v are both differentiable. Then:
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(i) If there exists a p ∈ (0, 1) such that p < w(p), then the agent is doubt-prone
somewhere. Similarly, if there exists p′ ∈ (0, 1) such that p′ > w(p′), then the agent
is doubt-averse somewhere.
(ii) If the agent is doubt-prone everywhere, then p ≤ w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). More-
over, if v exhibits stronger diminishing marginal utility than u, then N violates
quasi-convexity (that is, there exists some f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that
f ′  f ′′ and αf ′ + (1− α)f ′′ N f ′).
The differentiability assumption, though common, may seem bothersome as it is
not taken over the primitives. Alternatively, we could make an assumption over the
primitives that guarantees (for instance) strict concavity of u and v, which would
in fact be sufficient for the result.18 Given the results above, an assumption or
deduction over the agent’s doubt-attitude has testable implications concerning his
aggregation of probabilities (w) for unresolved lottery, and vice-versa. In addition,
these implications can be disentangled from the agent’s diminishing marginal utility.
Since it is not necessary that w satisfies the same empirical properties as the typical
case considered under rank-dependent utility, an experimental study would be useful
for a better understanding of the shape of w. If, in addition to doubt-proneness,
mean-preserving risk-aversion (in the standard sense) of N is assumed, then the
RDU representation collapses to the recursive EU representation:
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that the conditions of theorem 4 all hold. Then the following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) Preference  displays doubt-proneness everywhere and N displays mean pre-
serving risk-aversion.
(ii) Function VRDU is of the EU form (i.e. w(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1]), both u and
v are concave, and u = λ ◦ v for some continuous, concave, and increasing λ.
18For a discussion of the differentiability assumption, see Chew, Karni and Safra (1987).
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This result further shows that attitude toward risk and attitude towards doubt
constrain the probability weighting function, and can in fact completely characterize
it.19 But note that in an RDU setting, mean-preserving risk aversion is not identical
to diminishing marginal utility. That is, the previous result does not imply that a
doubt-prone agent who obeys risk aversion cannot have a concave utility function
v. I now focus a counterexample for which doubt-proneness is entirely due to the
weighting factor w, and not the difference in concavity between u and v.
Consider an agent for whom functions u and v are identical. It is already im-
mediate from theorem 4 that for a doubt-prone agent, it is necessary that p ≤ w(p)
for all p. In fact, this condition is sufficient.20 The following result does not require
differentiability.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the conditions of theorem 4 all hold. Furthermore, sup-
pose that u(z) = v(z) for all z ∈ Z (or, more generally, u = λ◦v for some continuous,
weakly concave, and increasing λ). Then the agent is doubt-prone everywhere if and
only if p ≤ w(p) (with p < w(p) for some p ∈ (0, 1) if u(z) = v(z) for all z ∈ Z).
It follows that an optimistic agent for whom u is identical v (or for whom u is more
concave than v) must be doubt-prone. These results therefore connect optimism,
doubt-proneness, and risk-aversion (in the standard sense). Before concluding this
section, note that extensive research has been conducted on the shape of w in the
usual RDU setting, in which uncertainty eventually resolves.21 As this a different
setting, I have not made similar assumptions over the shape of w. Instead, I have
shown that the induced preferences to remain in doubt have strong implications on
the weighting function w. Consider, for example, the common assumption that w is
19This last corollary is similar to a result in Grant, Kajii and Polak (2000) but with a notion
of doubt-proneness that is weaker than the preference for late-resolution that would be required
in the framework they use; the difference in assumptions is due to the difference in settings. It
is also of note that under Grant, Kajii and Polak (2000)’s restriction, there is no need to assume
differentiability, as it is in fact implied.
20It is clear that if p = w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1) and if u(z) = v(z) for all z ∈ Z, then the agent is
doubt-neutral.
21See, for instance, Karni and Safra (1990), and Prelec (1998) for an axiomatic treatment of w.
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S-shaped (concave on the initial interval and convex beyond). In that case, it must
be that the agent is doubt-prone for some lotteries and doubt-averse for others. But
an empirical discussion of whether w is S-shaped in this setting is outside the scope
of this paper. I now turn to the applications.
1.4 Applications
I consider two applications in this section. In the first, an agent’s utility depends
directly on his ability, since it is related to his self-image. He may never fully observe
his ability, but his success at performing tasks provides him with an imperfect signal.
How well he performs a task also depends on his effort. Performing a task better
provides him with a reward, and so in the standard EU setting, he would always put
in as much effort as he can if effort is costless. In this setting, however, there is a
tradeoff between obtaining a better reward by putting in more effort and obtaining
a coarser signal of ability by putting in less effort. Under some conditions, the agent
has an incentive to self-handicap, as is shown below. This setup also accommodates
other well known behavioral patterns. Under one version of this setup, an agent
has an incentive to remain with the status quo. In another version of this setup,
a risk-neutral agent prefers less risky bonds with a lower expected return to more
risky stocks with a higher expected return. This agent is also willing to pay a firm
to invest for him, even if he knows that the firm does not have superior expertise.
In the second application, voters all have the same preferences, but they do not
know who the better candidate is. However, they can acquire this information at
no cost. I demonstrate that there are equilibria in which they choose to remain
ignorant, and the wrong candidate is as likely to win as the right candidate.
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1.4.1 Preservation of self-image
I first introduce a general setup, before analyzing the implications of the results
in different contexts. I assume that the agent places direct value on his ability,
independently of the effect it has on his monetary reward. Arguably, individuals
care about their self-image, and would rather think of themselves as being of higher
ability than lower ability. Their success at achieving their goals, given how much
effort they put in, provides them with imperfect signals of their ability.
Suppose then that the agent is endowed with ability (or type) t ∈ [t, t] ∈ R. He
does not know what his ability is, but his prior probability of having ability t is p(t).
The agent chooses effort e ∈ [e, e] ∈ R, to obtain a reward m ∈ [m,m] ∈ R. Although
the agent may never observe his ability, he does observe m. The reward depends on
his ability, the effort he puts in, and an intrinsic uncertainty. Let p(m|e, t) denote his
probability of receiving reward m given his effort e and his ability t. Since he does not
know what his ability is ex-ante, his prior probability of receiving m given effort e is
p(m|e) =
∑
t∈[t,t]
p(m|e, t)p(t). Assume that the expected reward is higher if he puts in
more effort for any given ability, and it is higher if he is of higher ability at any given
effort level: Em(e, t) > Em(e, t′)⇔ t > t′, and Em(e, t) > Em(e′, t)⇔ e > e′.22
The agent’s value function W depends on both his reward m and on his intrinsic
ability t. Assume that his utility for m is linear; more precisely, his expected utility
over m is Em(e). In addition, it is linearly separable from his utility over t. He
is weakly risk-averse over t (for both resolved and unresolved lotteries) as well as
doubt-prone.23 As in the theory section, let u be his resolved utility, and let v be his
unresolved utility. Notice that with these assumptions, the agent’s preferences over
his ability reduce to a two-period Kreps-Porteus (KP) representation.
In the standard case in which the agent expects to observe both his ability t and
22All the probability distributions in this section have finite support.
23Note that by corollary 4.1, the weighting function here is linear, w(p) = p. In addition, since
the agent is doubt-prone and risk-averse in the unresolved lotteries, corollary 4.1 also implies that
that he is risk-averse in the resolved lotteries.
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his reward m, then his value function is:
W (e) = Em(e) + Eu(t)
Since effort is costless, it is immediate that he should put in the highest level of effort,
e = e. But now suppose that he does not necessarily observe his ability ex-post. In
this case, when he receives his monetary reward, he simply updates his probability
on his ability, given m and his chosen effort level e. His value function is therefore:
W (e) = Em(e) +
∑
m
p(m|e)u
(
v−1(Ev(t|m, e))
)
Depending on the functional form, the agent might not put in effort e = e. His
effort level also depends on his incentive to obtain the least information concerning
his ability, since he is doubt-prone. In other words, he takes into account what the
combination of his effort and the reward he obtains allow him to deduce about his
ability. Suppose that there is a unique effort level eo (the ‘ostrich’ effort) that is
entirely uninformative, i.e. p(t|m, eo) = p(t) for all t ∈ [t, t] and for all m ∈ [m,m].
Note that eo provides the agent with the highest expected utility over his ability.
That is, define
C(e) ≡ u
(
v−1(Ev(t))
)
−
∑
m
p(m|e)u
(
v−1(Ev(t|m, e))
)
As shown in the appendix, it is always the case that C(e) > 0 (for e 6= eo) for a
doubt-prone agent, with C(eo) = 0. Redefining the value function to be W̃ (e) =
W (e)− u (v−1(Ev(t))), the agent maximizes
W̃ (e) = Em(e)− C(e)
Hence C(e) is effectively the ‘shadow’ cost of effort due to acquiring information
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that he would rather ignore. The optimal effort level depends on the importance of
the expected reward Em(e) relative to the agent’s disutility of acquiring information
concerning his ability, as is captured by C(e). Suppose now that e0 = e, and that
the agent obtains a more informative signal (in the Blackwell sense) for a higher
effort e. Then C(e) = 0, and C(e) is strictly increasing, so that the ‘shadow’ cost is
increasing in effort level. The following simple example serves as an illustration.
Numerical Example
Let e = t = 0, e = t = 1, p(t = 0) = 1
2
and p(t = 1) = 1
2
. The agent’s reward m only
takes value $0 and $100. The probability of obtaining reward m = $100 given e and
t are:
p(m = $100|t = 1, e) = e
p(m = $100|t = 0, e) = 0
and p(m = $0|t, e) = 1 − p(m = $100|t, e). The utility functions are u = a
√
t for
some a > 0, and v = t.
Note that in this example, the completely uninformative effort eo is equal to 0.
At effort e = 0, he is sure to obtain $0, and his posterior on his ability is the same
as his prior. As he puts in more effort, he obtains a sharper signal of his ability. If
he puts in maximum effort e = 1, then he will fully deduce his ability ex-post: if he
obtains $100 then he knows he has ability t = 1, and if he obtains $0 then he knows
he has ability t = 0. His value function is now:
W̃ (e) = 50− C(e)
where C(e) = a
2
(
√
2− e−
√
2− 3e+ e2).
The optimal level of effort e∗ is in the full range [0, 1], depending on a. More
precisely, for interior solutions, e∗ is the smaller root of the equation e2−3e+ 2d−9
d−4 =
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0, where d =
(
200
a
+ 2
)2
. As a increases, the monetary reward m becomes less
significant, and e∗ decreases. As a decreases, the agent’s utility over his ability
becomes less significant, and the effort level increases (see appendix for details).
Self-handicapping
The setup presented here can be applied to several different contexts, the most imme-
diate of which is self-handicapping. There is strong anecdotal evidence that people
are sometimes restrained by a ‘fear of failure’, and will not put in as much effort as
they could. Berglas and Jones (1978) find in an experiment that individuals delib-
erately impede their own chances of success, and attribute this behavior to people’s
desire to protect the image of the self.24 The amount of optimal self-handicapping
depends on the doubt-proneness of the agent, and how good of a signal he expects to
obtain. As discussed above, choosing a higher effort level leads to a tradeoff between
the improved reward Em(e) and the incurred cost C(e) of learning more about one’s
actual ability. This model also confirms Berglas and Jones’ intuition that those who
are more likely to self-handicap are not the most successful or the least successful,
but rather those who are uncertain about their own competence. Akerlof and Dick-
ens’ (1982) observation that people will remain ignorant so as to protect their ego
is also in agreement with the implications of this framework. But notice that here,
self-handicapping follows from the agent’s doubt-proneness over his decision making
ability, and not from an ability to lie to himself or to manipulate his beliefs in any
way.
Status quo bias
The endowment effect and status quo bias are analyzed by Kahneman, Knetch and
Thaler (1991), and are explained using framing effects and loss aversion. The agent’s
preference for avoiding a loss is taken to be stronger than his preference for making
24See Benabou and Tirole (2002) for an explanation that uses manipulable beliefs.
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a gain, and the reference point for what constitutes a gain or a loss is assumed to be
the status quo. However, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) do not view the status
quo bias to be solely a consequence of loss-aversion: “Our results show the presence
of status quo bias even when there are no explicit gain/loss framing effects.... Thus,
we conclude that status quo bias is a general experimental finding – consistent with,
but not solely prompted by, loss aversion.” The framework discussed here can be
applied to some settings in which a status quo bias is present.
Suppose that e now represents a choice over different bundles rather than effort.
For instance, suppose that the agent only places probability on e and e, and that e
corresponds to keeping the current allocation, while e corresponds to switching to
another bundle. In addition, suppose that acquiring a bundle also carries information
on the agent’s decision making ability. In this case, rather than representing a cost of
effort, C(e) represents the cost of deviating from the bundle that is least informative
of the agent’s decision making ability. Suppose that e0 = e, so that keeping the
same bundle is uninformative. Then the agent exhibits a status quo bias, since
inaction (keeping the same bundle) has information cost C(e0) = 0. Note, however,
that when keeping the status quo bundle is more informative than obtaining other
bundles, then a doubt-prone agent would be biased against the status quo.
The key difference between the model presented here and the standard vNM
model is that this model allows for an asymmetry in the value of acquiring a bundle
compared to losing that bundle. The bundle itself does not change value based on
whether the agent is endowed with it or not, and in that sense there is no framing
effect. Instead, acquiring a new bundle in itself has different informational implica-
tions than selling it. In the case where the unobserved prize is the agent’s ability,
then acquiring a new bundle may provide him with more information on his ability
than keeping his current allocation. A more thorough explanation can be found in
chapter 2 of the dissertation.
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Bonds, stocks and paternity
Consider the case in which e represents an investment decision rather than effort. A
higher e represents a more risky investment, but in expectation it leads to a higher
monetary reward. As before, t corresponds to a notion of ability. An individual who
is of higher decision-making ability makes a wiser investment choice and therefore
obtains a higher expected monetary reward, given the chosen risk level. For instance,
e might be a portfolio consisting solely of bonds, while e consists solely of higher-risk
stocks. Maintain the assumption that eo = e. In other words, the riskless option is
also least informative concerning the agent’s potential as an investor.
In this setting, although the agent is risk-neutral in money, his chosen bundle e∗
may still consist of more bonds than it would if the reward were purely monetary,
as there is a bias towards e.25 In addition, suppose that a firm exists which offers to
invest the agent’s money in his place. Even if the agent puts the same prior on his
ability in investing as he does on the firm’s, he still agrees to pay. Since the optimal
level of risk in this case is e, he is willing to pay up to Em(e)−Em(e∗) +C(e∗). In
fact, even if the firm were to choose the suboptimal level e∗, he would be willing to
pay up to C(e∗).
In the standard EU model, the agent’s choice would only depend on the monetary
reward he expects to obtain. In contrast, the framework presented here allows the
agent’s choice to depend on the decision making process as well as on the reward he
expects to receive. That is, the agent bases his choice on the manner in which he
expects to obtain the monetary reward.
1.4.2 Political Ignorance
The high degree of political ignorance of voters has been thoroughly researched,
particularly in the US (see Bartels (1996)). Given the length of electoral cam-
paigns in American politics, the amount of media coverage and the accessibility of
25Of course, no claim is made concerning the empirical significance of this effect.
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informational sources, it seems that the cost of acquiring information should not be
prohibitive for voters. Note that there are political issues whose resolution the voters
may never observe. For instance, the voters may choose not to observe the amount
of foreign aid given, the degree of lobbying or nepotism, or the government stance on
interrogation methods. For those issues, a doubt-prone agent may have incentive to
ignore information even if it is free. In other words, making information more acces-
sible would not necessarily have a strong impact on the individual’s informativeness
on these issues. Since voters affect the election result as a group, each individual’s
decision to acquire information has an externality on other voters and on their deci-
sion to acquire information. This section discusses a very simple example in which
voters’ information acquisition plays a dominant role on the other voters’ decision
to acquire information. Although voting is sincere, there is a strategic aspect to the
decision to acquire information.
Consider an economy in which N citizens care about issue γ ∈ [0, 1], which is
determined by a politician that they vote for. They can choose not to observe what
the politician does. Suppose that there are two candidates, A and B. One of the
two will choose policy γ = 0 if elected, and the other will choose γ = 1. The voters
do not know which one is which, and place probability 1/2 that A will choose γ = 0,
and 1/2 that A will choose γ = 1 (and similarly for B). But they can acquire that
information at no cost, if they choose to do so. Let pi be the ex-post probability
that the ith agent places on the winner being the candidate who implements γ = 1,
where i ∈ {1, .., N} . The timing is as follows:
1) Each voter decides whether or not to observe where candidates A and B stand.
A voter cannot force another voter to acquire information.
2) Each voter votes sincerely, i.e. he votes for the candidate on whom he places a
higher probability of implementing policy γ that he prefers. If he is indifferent
or if he places equal probability on either candidate implementing his preferred
policy, then he tosses a fair coin and votes accordingly.
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3) The candidate who obtains the majority wins the election. In case of a tie, a
coin toss determines the winner. The winner then implements the policy he
prefers, and there is no possibility of reelection.
Now suppose that every voter prefers γ to be higher. In addition, every voter is
also strictly doubt-prone. Let his value function be W Ii if he acquires information
and WNi if he does not. Even though every voter prefers the candidate who imple-
ments γ = 1, and even though information is free, there is still an equilibrium in
which no one acquires information, and the candidate who implements γ = 0 wins
with probability 1
2
. This equilibrium is Pareto-dominated (in expectation) by the
other equilibria, in which at least a strict majority of agents acquires information,
and the candidate who implements γ = 1 wins with probability 1. This is briefly
shown below.
1) Equilibrium in which no voter is informed. If no other voter is informed, then
voter i does not acquire information either. Since pi ∈ (0, 1) if no one else is in-
formed, it follows that W Ii < W
N
i (on his own he cannot force pi ∈ {0, 1}). Unless
agent i is certain that either the right candidate or the wrong candidate always wins
the election, i.e. that pi = 1 or that pi = 0, he does not acquire information.
Note that there is no equilibrium in which a minority of voters acquires information,
since each voter in the minority has incentive to deviate. Note also that the differ-
ence between W Ii and W
N
i for a given pi ∈ (0, 1) is higher if the difference between
the agent’s utility of γ = 1 and γ = 0 is larger.
2) Equilibrium in which at least a strict majority is informed. If at least a strict
majority is informed, then the right candidate wins with probability 1. Hence pi = 1
for each agent i, and so he is indifferent, since W Ii = W
N
i . Note, however, that this
equilibrium does not survive if each voter i places an arbitrarily small probability
δ > 0 that each of the other voters does not acquire information.
35
The externality of information plays an excessive role in this simple example,
however it may still have an impact in a more realistic model. In particular, this
example suggests that as the difference between the agent’s utility of the good policy
and his utility of the bad policy increases, a doubt-prone agent has less incentive to
acquire information. In addition, a Pareto gain would be achieved if enough voters
were ‘forced’ to acquire information on the candidates’ policies.
1.5 Extensions and relation to the KP represen-
tation
In this section, I first analyze the relation between this model and the Kreps-Porteus
(KP) representation (and, more generally, REU), and I show that the models are
formally distinct, even if independence axioms hold at every stage. This last result
may appear counterintuitive, since it may appear that a ‘never’ stage is formally
equivalent to a ‘much later’ stage, but with a different interpretation. I discuss the
reasons for the distinction between the two frameworks. The second part of this
section presents a general methodology for extending other models to incorporate
preferences over unresolved lotteries.
1.5.1 Relation to the KP representation
Suppose now, for simplicity, that there are 2 stages of resolution (early and late) in
a KP setup. Assume, however, that the agent is indifferent between early and late
resolution of uncertainty, so that there is a single utility function u associated with
lotteries that resolve. It is clear that in this case, the KP representation is identical
to an Expected Utility representation. But now, suppose that we include preferences
over unresolved lotteries. That is, let L2 is the set of simple lotteries over L1 ∪ L0.
For X ∈ L2, the notation X = (X1, qI1,e; ...;Xne , qIne,e; f1,e, qN1,e; ...; fme,e, qNme,e) ∈ L2,
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z5
z6
Figure 1.3: Lottery X = (X1, q
I
1,e; f1,e, q
N
1,e = 1− qI1,e).
where Xi,e ∈ L1, and fj,e ∈ L0. The subscript ‘e’ denotes the early stage. The
agent’s preferences  are now over L2, rather than L1 (see figure 3).
The timing is as follows. The agent first observes the outcome of the first stage lot-
tery (the early stage). For instance, with probability qIi,e, he receives a second lottery
Xi ∈ L1. The superscript I (‘Informed’) denotes that the agent expects to observe
the outcome of lottery Xi. With probability q
N
j,e, the agent receives a lottery f
N
j,e ∈ L0,
which does not resolve. Here, the superscript N (‘Not informed’ denotes that the
agent never observes the resolution of fNj,e. A lottery f
N
j,e (henceforth ‘early unresolved
lottery’) is a terminal node, in the sense that the agent does not expect it to lead to a
second stage. Now suppose that the first (early) stage lottery leads to a second (late)
stage lottery Xi = (z1, q
I
1,l; z2, q
I
2,l; ...; zn, q
I
nl,l
; fN1,l, q
N
1,l; f
N
2,l, q
N
2,l; ...; f
N
m,l, q
N
m,l). This sec-
ond lottery always resolves. With probability qIh,l, the agent receives a final outcome
zIh,l, which he observes. With probability q
N
k,l, he receives a lottery f
N
k,l ∈ L0 which
never resolves (henceforth ‘late unresolved lottery’). The difference between a lottery
fNe and a lottery f
N
l is that f
N
e knows after the early stage that f
N
e never resolves,
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while he knows after the late stage that fNl does not resolve. As before, the q
I ’s and
qN ’s are used to distinguish between the probabilities that lead to prizes where he
is fully informed of the outcome (since he directly observes which z occurs), and the
probabilities that lead to prizes where he is not informed (since he only observes the
ensuing lottery).
Suppose now that an independence axiom for unresolved lottery holds at every
stage. That is, define N,e and N,l in the natural way, and let an independence
axiom hold for each of these preferences. In this case, there are unresolved utility
functions ve, vl associated with N,e and N,l, respectively:
W(X) =
∑
qI(z)u(z) +
∑
qIi,e(z)
(∑
qNi,lu
(
v−1l
(
Evl(z|fNi,l )
)))
+
∑
qNi,eu
(
v−1e
(
Eve(z|fNi,e)
))
Note that ve and vl need not be the same, since N,e and N,l are separate. Hence,
there are three utility functions in this setting: utility u is associated with lotteries
that eventually resolve, while functions ve and vl are associated with early and
late unresolved lotteries. It is immediate, therefore, that having a KP model that
accommodates unresolved lotteries is formally distinct from simply adding a ‘never’
stage, as this can only account for one additional utility function. The reason for
this distinction is that the agent’s perception of the unresolved lotteries need not be
the same in the early stage as it is in the second stage.
There is another, and perhaps more fundamental, difference between temporal
resolution and lack of resolution. While the early stage leads to the eventual oc-
currence of the late stage, there is no notion of sequence for unresolved lotteries.
That is, the first unresolved lottery cannot lead to a second lottery; each unresolved
lottery is a final prize, and hence a terminal node. For that reason, while the KP
representation will have terms such as ue(u
−1
l (·)), there cannot be an equivalent un-
resolved term, ve(v
−1
l (·)). In this representation, both utility functions ve and vl are
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terminal, in the sense that the expectations are over outcomes, and not over any fur-
ther lotteries. While the notation is cumbersome, this representation demonstrates
that each unresolved lottery is essentially a final prize, and its value depends on
whether it is obtained early or late. The agent’s preferences over unresolved lotter-
ies are allowed to vary in time, even when he has neutral preferences over the timing
of resolution of uncertainty. The distinction between the KP representation and a
representation that takes into account preferences for unresolved lotteries holds if the
independence axioms over N,e and N,l are relaxed. In other words, this distinction
carries through to more general REU representations.
1.5.2 General Methodology
This paper has extended the vNM EU model to allow for the distinction between
lotteries that lead to observed outcomes and lotteries that never resolve, from the
agent’s viewpoint. I now present a simple methodology for extending other models
to make this distinction as well. These models do not need to satisfy the general
independence axiom A.4. I introduce another axiom instead. This axiom is weak
enough to accommodate a broad class of continuous preferences, including a strict
preference for randomization.
Suppose that an agent is indifferent between receiving an outcome z̃ as a final prize
and an unresolved lottery f . It is now assumed that the agent is also indifferent be-
tween receiving unresolved lottery f and prize z̃ with the same probability. In other
words, I assume that the agent’s valuation, or perception, of unresolved lottery f
is independent of the probability with which he receives it, and it is independent of
the probability of receiving any other prize. The value placed on unresolved lottery
f and the value placed on outcome z̃ are always the same.
AXIOM E.1 (Unresolved lottery equivalent): For all f ∈ L0, z̃ ∈ Z such that
δf ∼ δz̃, and for all X, X̃ ∈ L1 such that X = (z1, qI1 ; ...; zn, qIn; f, q; f2, qN2 ; ...; fm, qNm)
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and X̃ = (z1, q
I
1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; z̃, q; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m), the following holds: X ∼ X̃.
Note, however, that the existence of a z̃ for which δf ∼ δz̃ is at the moment not
guaranteed. The following lemma presents conditions for which this is the case:
Lemma 1 (Certainty equivalent). Suppose axioms A.1 through A.3 hold. In
addition, suppose that N obeys stochastic dominance. Then there exists an H:
L0 → Z such that for all f ∈ L0, δH(f) ∼ δf .
That is, for any unresolved lottery δf , there exists a certainty equivalent H(f) for
which the agent is indifferent between receiving unresolved lottery δf and outcome
H(f) (or degenerate lottery δH(f)) for sure. For any lottery f , therefore, z̃ in axiom
E.1 is equal to the certainty equivalent H(f). Note that the main representation
theorem in the paper makes no mention of axiom E.1; this is because it is trivially
implied if the independence axiom A.4 holds.
Lemma 2. Suppose axioms A.1 through A.4 hold. Then axiom E.1 holds.
Without the independence axiom A.4, however, it is no longer the case that E.1
necessarily holds. If it is explicitly assumed, if axioms A.1 through A.3 hold, and
if N obeys stochastic dominance, then any lottery X =
(z1, q
I
1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; ...; fm, q
N
m) ∈ L1 can be replaced with a lottery X̂ =
(z1, q
I
1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; H(f1), q
N
1 ; ...;H(fm), q
N
m) ∈ L0. Note that X ∼ X̂, by a repeated
application of axiom E.1. This property essentially reduces two-stage lotteries to
one-stage lotteries. It therefore allows a straightforward extension of different types
of frameworks, so as to distinguish between resolved and unresolved lotteries. To
emphasize this point, suppose that a ‘simple model’ is loosely defined as follows:
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Definition (Simple Model) A simple model 〈̂,W, T 〉 consists of :
• A preference relation ̂ over one-stage lotteries in L0.
• A representation W : L0 → R for which f ̂ f ′ ⇔ W (f) ≥ W (f ′) for all
f, f ′ ∈ L0.
• A set of axioms T that allow ̂ to be closed in the weak convergence topology,
and that are sufficient for representation W to hold.
Then, any simple model can be expanded to accommodate the distinction be-
tween resolved and unresolved lotteries, in the following way. Take a simple model
〈̂,W, T 〉. Since it is usually implicitly assumed that the agent will observe the
outcome of a lottery, suppose that for all f, f ′ ∈ L0, f ̂ f ′ ⇔ f  f ′. That is,
the set of axioms T is taken to hold for all resolved lotteries. If in addition, axioms
A.1 through A.3 and axiom E.1 hold, then  is represented as follows: for any
X,X ′ ∈ L1, X  X ′ ⇔ W (X̂) ≥ W (X̂ ′).26 As for a representation of H, note
that the set of axioms for unresolved lotteries considered in the paper can also be
replaced by a second simple model 〈̂N ,WN , TN 〉.
I now provide conditions for obtaining doubt-neutrality (indifference between
observing and not observing the outcome) for preferences that satisfy A.1 through
A.3 and stochastic dominance.27 This simple result demonstrates that assuming
doubt-neutrality has strong implications on the agent’s allowable preferences, inde-
pendently of the independence axiom A.4. Recall that for lotteries f, f ′ ∈ L0, the
notation f  f ′ denotes a comparison between lotteries that the agent expects to
observe; while δf  δf ′ denotes a comparison between the same lotteries, but they
remain unresolved.
26Where, as before, for X = (z1, q
I
1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; ...; fm, q
N
m),
X̂ = (z1, q
I
1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; H(f1), q
N
1 ; ...;H(fm), q
N
m) ∈ L0, and similarly for X ′ and X̂ ′.
27See Segal (1990) for a similar result on time-neutrality in an REU setting.
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Doubt-neutrality result. Suppose axioms A.1 through A.3 hold. In addition,
suppose that N obeys stochastic dominance. Then the following three conditions
are equivalent:
(i) f ∼ δf for all f ∈ L0
(ii) f  f ′ ⇒ δf  δf ′ for all f, f ′ ∈ L0
(iii) δf  δf ′ ⇒ f  f ′ for all f, f ′ ∈ L0
In words, suppose that an agent has a choice between observing and not observing
the outcome of a lottery. Then he is always indifferent, for this type of choice, if and
only if the order between any lotteries f, f ′ ∈ L0 is always strictly preserved. That
is, if he strictly prefers f to f ′ when he expects to observe the outcome, then he also
strictly prefers f to f ′ if he does not expect to see the outcome. Arguably, condition
(i) is often violated, even in models that depart significantly from the standard vNM
model. Consider, for instance, the following variant of Machina’s (1989) mother
example. Suppose that a donor to a charity has no strict preference over which
worthwhile cause receives the benefit from his donation, but he prefers that it be
decided randomly, for reasons of fairness. He may still prefer not to observe which
cause receives it, and to remain in doubt (and perhaps this encourages him to donate
to an umbrella organization rather a more targeted one). It must therefore be the
case that there are some lotteries f, f ′ over the recipients which he ranks differently
based on whether he observes the outcome.
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1.6 Closing remarks
This paper provides a representation theorem for preferences over lotteries whose
outcomes may never be observed. The agent’s perception of the unobserved out-
come, relative to his risk-aversion, induces his attitude towards doubt. This rela-
tion is captured by his resolved utility function u, his unresolved utility function
v and his unresolved decision weighting function w. The model presented here is
an extension of the vNM framework, and it does not entail a significant axiomatic
departure. However, it can accommodate behavioral patterns that are inconsistent
with expected utility, and that have motivated a wide array of different frameworks.
For instance, doubt-prone individuals have an incentive to self-handicap, and this
incentive is higher if they are less certain about their competence.28 Doubt-prone
individuals are also more likely to choose the status quo bundle, if making a decision
is more informative than inaction. In addition, an agent who is risk-neutral may
still favor less risky investments, and would pay a firm to invest for him, even if
it does not have superior expertise. The agent’s attempt to preserve his self-image
implies that his utility depends not only on the outcome that results, but also on
the action taken. In a political economy context, doubt-proneness encourages polit-
ical ignorance. When individuals derive more utility from the policies that they are
not required to observe, they have less incentive to acquire information. Moreover,
agents have a greater disutility from acquiring information if they are more ignorant
ex-ante.
Finally, note that experiments that address the impact of anticipated regret fre-
quently allow for foregone outcomes that individuals do not observe (see Zeelenberg
(1999)). Similarly, in experiments by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007), subjects de-
liberately choose to ignore free information concerning the full consequences of their
actions. These empirical findings would be useful in determining plausible degrees
28Recall that this model does not allow agents to be delusional, since they are unable to mislead
themselves into having false beliefs.
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of doubt-proneness, although this is outside the scope of this paper.
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Chapter 2
Information avoidance and the
preservation of self-image
Abstract
There are a number of patterns of observed behavior that appear incom-
patible with the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected
Utility model. For instance, behavior associated with anticipated regret,
the Allais paradox and preferences for smaller menus are difficult to rec-
oncile with the vNM framework. Evidence that individuals display a
status quo bias has also motivated models that differ significantly from
Expected Utility. In financial settings, ambiguity aversion has been used
to accommodate a safe allocation bias, in which agents choose neither
to buy nor short sell an asset for an interval of prices. Empirical find-
ings that individuals choose to ‘self-handicap’ have been explained with
notions of self-deception, cognitive dissonance and belief manipulation.
Recently, experiments have been conducted in which dictators in dictator
games who seem to exhibit preferences for fairness often switch to the
‘selfish’ choice if they can avoid observing the recipient’s allocation.
I show that these seemingly unrelated findings can be accommodated by
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a single, natural extension of the vNM model. On an intuitive level, the
model is based on the assumption that decision makers wish to preserve
their self-image and may be averse to obtaining signals of their self-worth.
Agents obey standard axioms, and they are not allowed to manipulate
their beliefs in any way nor to display any other form of self-deception.
Instead, when choosing a course of action, agents take into considera-
tion what the consequences of their actions will reveal to them about
themselves. They cannot ignore bad signals and overweigh good signals,
but their actions affect the amount of information they expect to receive
concerning their self-worth. The agents’ preference for controlling the
flow of information suffices to accommodate diverse behavioral patterns.
2.1 Introduction
Individuals often let their choices depend on what they expect to learn, even when
this information does not have a direct impact on them. Consider, for instance,
Zeelenberg’s (1999) Dutch lottery example. Subjects in two groups have the choice
between buying a lottery ticket and keeping their money. A person in the ‘no-
feedback’ group does not find out whether he would have won if he does not buy
the ticket. In contrast, a person in the ‘feedback’ group observes the outcome of
the lottery, independently of his choice. In this experimental setup, subjects in
the feedback group buy more tickets, on average, than subjects in the no-feedback
group. In another experiment, Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) find that proposers
in an ultimatum game offer significantly less money if they expect to be told the
minimal acceptable offer afterwards. The results of these studies are difficult to
reconcile with Expected Utility theory.1
In both examples, people arguably prefer not to observe the outcome of the
1More generally, models in which primitive preferences are taken over lotteries over received
outcomes are inconsistent with these results.
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unchosen lottery.2 In the Dutch lottery case, individuals may not want to know
that they would have won the risky lottery, had they played (Zeelenberg and Pieters
(2004)). Similarly, proposers in the ultimatum game may prefer not to learn what the
minimal acceptable offer would have been. Consider the dictator game experiment
conducted by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007). Dictators are unsure of the amount
that they are actually giving the recipient, as it depends on a hidden lottery whose
outcome they do not observe. They could, however, observe this outcome at no
cost before making their decision, which allows them to choose the exact quantity
given to the recipient. A significant percentage (44%) of dictators chooses to avoid
acquiring information. On average, they keep a higher allocation for themselves and
leave a smaller allocation to the recipient compared to when there is no uncertainty.
Dana, Weber and Kuang conclude that “many subjects behave consistently with a
desire to remain ignorant to the consequences of a self-interested choice.” These
results suggest that there is a connection between a preference to remain ignorant
and the empirical findings described here. In this paper, I explore this relation and
demonstrate that preferences to remain ignorant are consistent with these findings
and other seemingly unrelated patterns of behavior.
It might appear that unobserved outcomes should be irrelevant to the agent’s
choice. He does not consume the reward that he does not receive, irrespective of
whether it is high or low. But it is plausible that the agent is concerned with how his
self-worth is affected, not with the foregone consumption per se. In the Dutch lottery
example, individuals who realize that they have made the wrong decision presumably
feel worse about themselves. In the dictator game, a dictator who believes that he
ought to give a fair share to the recipient may experience diminished self-worth if
he observes ex-post that the recipient has actually received a small amount. This
argument does not require altruism or other-regarding preferences. The agent may be
unconcerned with the recipient’s utility; his only concern could be the link between
2See Northcraft and Ashford (1990), Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk and Pieters (2002). For
a discussion on curiosity, see van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2007)
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his self-worth and his code of conduct.3 In Zeelenberg’s ultimatum game, an agent
who learns that he has overpaid feels foolish for having been ‘ripped-off’, and may
lower his assessment of his decision making ability.
In principle, the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility theory
(henceforth vNM) model is general enough that utility over self-worth can be in-
cluded in the agent’s value function. The vNM model places no restriction on what
prizes the agent is allowed to value. There is, however, one fundamental difference
between preferences over a consumption good and preferences over self-worth, which
is that self-worth, unlike a consumption good, is never observed. Instead, individu-
als’ self-image responds to the inferences they draw from the consequences of their
actions. But the vNM model cannot accommodate an individual’s preference to
avoid a signal over self-worth, as it does not distinguish between the choice to ob-
serve and not to observe the outcome. Since there are numerous settings in which
self-worth is a major factor, it is important to have a choice theoretic foundation
that allows for these preferences. My main objective in this paper is to present such
a framework, and to show that it does accommodate, and in fact predict, empirical
findings that are inconsistent with the vNM framework, including the Dutch lottery
example, the dictator game and the ultimatum game described here.
To characterize the agent’s preferences over self-worth, I make use of the VUI
(Value of Useless Information) model introduced in the first chapter of the disser-
tation. The VUI model allows decision makers to exhibit their preferences over
observing and not observing the outcome. Agents may strictly prefer to remain
ignorant and not observe an outcome (denoted doubt-proneness), or they may in-
stead prefer to acquire information (doubt-aversion). I assume throughout this paper
that agents are doubt-prone. They are not employing self-deception, in the sense
that they cannot lie to themselves or manipulate their own beliefs in any way. The
3See Benabou and Tirole (2007) for a discussion on the connection between self-image and
morality. As I later discuss, this model does allow for the interpretation that the agent has other-
regarding preferences, provided he remains doubt-prone.
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notions of regret and disappointment are not explicitly used in this setting either.
Rather, these choices stem from the difference between the agent’s expected utility
over outcomes that he eventually observes and his assessment of lotteries that never
resolve, from his frame of reference. Since the decision maker does not obtain ex-post
utility from the true outcome if he does not know what that outcome is, he does
not necessarily evaluate this lottery according to the expectation of a ‘non-received’
utility.4
I demonstrate that taking into account individuals’ doubt-proneness over self-
worth plays two roles. First, I show that a doubt-prone agent prefers having less
choices in his menu and exhibits menu dependence. These results do no use notions
of temptation or self-control. While models in which the agent prefers smaller menus
typically allow these choices by directly taking preferences over menus as primitives,
this framework follows the standard vNM model and only allows for preferences
over lotteries. Second, this model can explain a large array of empirical puzzles.
These well-known phenomena have motivated the development of models that differ
significantly from the standard vNM model and from each other. In particular,
the literature on anticipated regret might not appear related to the literature on the
status quo bias, which itself seems disconnected from the literature on self-deception.
But observed behavior that has motivated these separate modeling branches can be
connected by a single root cause, namely, the agent’s doubt-proneness:
(i) Anticipated regret. The Dutch lottery example is typically associated with
anticipated regret. Intuitively, an agent who knows he would have won the
lottery, if only he had played, regrets his decision. He is assumed to regret this
decision more than the decision of buying the lottery and losing.5 In this paper,
4For a full argument that does not appeal to this interpretation of expected utility, see chapter
1 of the dissertation.
5See Bell (1982), Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Sugden (1993). See Sarver (2008) for a model
of anticipated regret with primitive preferences over menus.
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this behavior is a consequence of the agent’s doubt-proneness. The safe lottery
is more informative of the agent’s self-worth in the feedback case than in the
no-feedback case, and is therefore less attractive. Moreover, this framework
implies that a agent doubt-prone strictly prefers smaller menus over lotteries
than larger menus, under some conditions. Each additional lottery in a menu
provides the agent with more signals about himself, which he would rather
avoid.
Note that this paper does not explicitly model regret. Rather, choices typically
associated with regret are entirely due to the individual’s preference for avoid-
ing information about his decision making ability. The relationship between
regret and self-image has been extensively studied in the psychology literature
(see Larrick (1993) for a survey). While the economic models of anticipated
regret do not explicitly model self-image, it is usually seen as an implicit fac-
tor. In this paper, preservation of self-image is the driving factor that leads to
behavior associated with anticipated regret.
Consider the well-known variant of the Allais paradox known as the common
ratio effect, which has also motivated models of anticipated regret (Loomes
and Sugden (1982)). Given the choice between $300 with probability 0.8 (and
$0 otherwise) and receiving $200 for sure, many people prefer $200. But when
given the choice between $300 with probability 0.4 and receiving $200 with
probability 0.5, a significant percentage of the same individuals choose $300
with probability 0.4.6 This preference reversal is a clear violation of the stan-
dard vNM model. In this framework, these choices are once again due to the
agent’s preference to avoid information concerning his self-worth. The agent
expects the choice that leads to $300 to be more informative of his self-worth
when compared to the certainty of receiving $200 than when compared to a
0.5 probability of receiving $200.
6These numbers are drawn directly from Gul (1991), who uses a disappointment aversion ex-
planation of the common ratio effect.
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(ii) Self-deception, cognitive dissonance and self-confidence. Economic models of
self-image generally assume a technology for belief manipulation or temporal
inconsistency. For instance, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) use manipulable beliefs
and the notion of cognitive dissonance to accommodate agents’ preference to
remain ignorant. Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2007), Bodner and Prelec (2003)
and Benabou (2008) explore different settings in which agents self-signal and
have access to belief manipulation.7
I follow the same view that self-image is relevant to agents, and that they have
a mechanism to draw inferences about themselves. But I demonstrate that
experimental results associated with self-deception, such as self-handicapping,
hold in this setting as well, without having recourse to belief manipulation or
temporal inconsistency. Models which take into account preferences for self-
image can therefore use this framework as an axiomatic foundation.
(iii) Status quo bias and the zero position bias. The status quo bias refers to indi-
viduals’ tendency to prefer their current endowment to other alternatives. It
is often seen as being irreconcilable with the vNM model, as it does not allow
a notion of ‘frame of reference’.8 In contrast, the status quo bias is consistent
with the VUI framework, even though it does not explicitly model a frame of
reference either. Rather, a doubt-prone agent has a tendency to maintain the
status quo if doing so is less informative of his self-worth than other alterna-
tives.
In settings in which keeping the status quo bundle is not the least informative,
this framework makes predictions that are not necessarily in line with the en-
dowment effect. This paper considers an application which distinguishes the
7See also Caplin and Leahy (2001), Compte and Postlewaite (2004) and Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005).
8See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and Kahneman, Knetch
and Thaler (1991).
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least informative choice from the status quo in a financial market. In a well-
known paper, Dow and Werlang (1992) use ambiguity (uncertainty) aversion
to demonstrate that there is a price range at which agents neither buy nor sell
an asset. This tendency does not imply that the agent is averse to trading, as
in models with a status quo bias or transaction costs. The same result holds
using this framework as well.
The economic environment in this paper is as follows. The agent’s utility is
linearly separable over his financial reward (money) and over his unobserved self-
worth. He is not allowed to manipulate his beliefs in any way. That is, he cannot
deceive himself into believing that he is better or worse than he is. Nevertheless, his
decisions can affect how much information he receives concerning his self-worth. The
agent first chooses a menu of lotteries over his financial reward, and subsequently
chooses a lottery from within that menu. He expects to observe the outcome of every
lottery within the menu he chooses. He does not, however, observe which outcome
occurs for any other lottery. In other words, he receives feedback for every element
within his chosen menu, and he does not receive feedback for any other element. He
then uses the information he acquires as a signal concerning his self-worth, which he
uses to update his beliefs in a Bayesian way.
As an illustration of the reasoning used throughout this paper, consider again
the Dutch lottery example. In this framework, the agent believes the consequences
of the lotteries, given his actions, are informative of his decision making ability. In
the feedback case, the agent expects to receive a signal that affects his belief, since
he observes the final outcome of both lotteries, regardless of his choice. In the no-
feedback case, he obtains the same signal only if he buys the ticket; he does not
acquire any information if he chooses the safe lottery. The safe lottery is therefore
more informative in the feedback case than in the no-feedback case, while the risky
lottery is exactly as informative in both cases. A doubt-prone agent essentially
avoids the risky lottery in the no-feedback case because of the information it provides
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concerning his decision making ability.
An issue of concern is whether the agent’s choices allow for his utility over his
financial reward to be disentangled from his utility over self-worth. Self-worth is
not only unobserved by the agent, it is also unobserved by the modeler. Ideally we
would like the agent’s choices to reveal his preferences over money. I show that this
is indeed the case under some conditions. The utility function over money can be
fully recovered and characterized from his choices. This framework also has clear
testable implications that are consistent with the empirical findings provided in this
discussion. For instance, consider the set S = {{f, g}, {f, g, h}}. Suppose that the
agent chooses lottery f from menu {f, g}, and that he also chooses f from menu
{f, g, h}. If given the choice between the two menus, the agent would be indifferent
between in a vNM setting. In this framework, however, the doubt-prone agent
strictly prefers the smaller menu {f, g}.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework, and section
3 analyzes the main results. Section 4 focuses on the safe allocation bias, section
5 analyzes the revealed preference implications, section 6 applies this framework to
the dictator game and the ultimatum game, and section 7 concludes. All proofs are
in the appendix.
2.2 Model
I first introduce the setting. The agent makes a sequence of choices: he first chooses
a menu over lotteries over his final reward, in this case money. Given his choice
of menu, he knows that he will not only observe the outcome he receives, but also
the outcome of every other lottery within his menu. I then characterize the agent’s
preferences over money and over his own fixed self-worth. The agent’s utility over
money is of the standard vNM form. Since the agent’s self-worth is fixed, the vNM
model predicts that it is of no relevance to his decision-making. But in this paper,
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I take into account that self-worth is unobserved. Furthermore, the agent is doubt-
prone, meaning that he prefers not to acquire information concerning his self-worth.
In the final part of this section, I describe the precise nature of the signal that the
agent expects to receive concerning his self-worth.
2.2.1 Setting
Let the agent’s final prize be a monetary reward r, drawn from the setR = [r, r] ⊂ R.
Let Lr be the set of simple lotteries over R, with typical element f ∈ Lr, and let 2Lr ,
with typical element M ∈ 2Lr , be the set of all menus over lotteries over R. The
timing of the agent’s decision is as follows. He must first choose a menu, which is
drawn from a set of menus S = {M1,M2, ...,Mn} ⊆ 2Lr . Suppose that he chooses
menu Mi = {f i1, f i2, ...f ini}. He then chooses a lottery f ij from within menu Mi.9 The
agent knows that he will observe the resulting outcomes {ri1, ..., rini} for every lottery
within the menu Mi he receives, regardless of his choice. These are the only outcomes
he observes; in particular, he does not observe the outcomes from the menus that he
has not chosen. He has perfect recall, and so he remembers ex-post the set S from
which he chose his menu Mi, and he remembers that he has chosen lottery f
i
j . This
information is captured by his ex-post history H = (ri1, ..., r
i
ni
; f ij ;Mi;S).
As an example (table 2.1), let the agent first choose between menus from set
S = {M1,M2}, where M1 = {f 11 , f 12 , f 13} and M2 = {f 21 , f 22}. Suppose that he
chooses M1, and subsequently chooses lottery f
1
1 . He observes the outcomes of
lottery f 11 (in this case $100), but also the outcomes of lottery f
1
2 and f
1
3 (in this
case $250 and $0, respectively). The agent remembers, ex-post, his choice of menu
M1 from S, his choice of lottery f
i
1, and every outcome that he has observed. This
history is denoted H = ($100, $250, $0; f 11 ;M1;S).
9Formally, let CS(S) be the correspondence that denotes the agent’s choice of menu, and let
CM (Mi|S) be the correspondence that denotes the agent’s choice of lottery from menu Mi. The
agent receives menu and lottery {Mi, f ij}, where Mi ∈ CS(S) and f ij ∈ CM (Mi|S). I assume for
convenience that the menu and lottery he receives are drawn at random from his choices.
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Initial Set Chosen menu Chosen lottery Observed outcomes
S = {{f 11 , f 12 , f 13}, {f 21 , f 22}} {f 11 , f 12 , f 13} f 11 {$100, $250, $0}
Table 2.1: Sample sequence.
2.2.2 Preferences
In characterizing the agent’s preferences, I take into account both his preferences
over the consumption good (money) and his preferences over unobserved self-worth.
When deciding what menu and lottery to choose, the agent considers not only his
expected utility over money, but also how much information he expects to receive
concerning his self-worth. I now describe the agent’s preferences, and the next
subsection describes the inferences he draws, given the consequences of his choices.
The agent has separable utility over the monetary reward r he receives and over
his unobserved self-worth (or talent). The agent’s utility over money is of the stan-
dard vNM form, and is characterized by utility function ur. Given lottery over
money f , the agent’s expected utility is Eur(f), where the expectation operator is
defined in the usual way.10 The agent’s talent is in the set [t, t].Assume, for simplic-
ity, that the agent only places ex-ante probability pt ∈ (0, 1) of having high talent
t and probability 1 − pt of having low talent t. Under this assumption, the VUI
representation for the agent’s talent is captured by a function upt : [0, 1]→ R. Given
ex-post belief p of having high talent, his utility is upt(p), provided he never observes
the resolution of uncertainty.
The function upt can be interpreted as the agent’s utility function over the like-
lihood that he is of high talent t. The agent is never certain of being of high talent
t or low talent t, and so his final prize is not the actual outcome t or t. Instead, his
prize will be the ex-post probability p of being of type t (and 1− p of being t). An
agent who strictly prefers to avoid information (a doubt-prone agent) is effectively
10Specifically, Eur(f) =
∑
r∈f
p(r|f)u(r), where p(r|f) is the probability of r occurring, given
lottery f .
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risk-averse over this likelihood of being of high talent. In other words, his utility
function upt is concave, which I assume throughout this discussion.
The standard vNM representation is a special case of this representation; it cor-
responds to the case in which function upt is linear. If upt were to be linear, then the
agent would always be indifferent between receiving a more informative signal and
a less informative signal. His self-worth would play no role in his decision making. I
demonstrate in section 5 that under some conditions, the agent has preferences for
smaller menus if upt is concave, i.e. if he is doubt prone. Combining the agent’s util-
ity over money and his utility over self-worth, we obtain the following value function:
Value function
W (f ij ,Mi|S) = Eur(f ij) +
∑
{ri1,...rini}∈Mi
upt (p(t|H))
ni∏
h=1
p(rih|f ih). (2.1)
Hence, the agent chooses menu Mi and lottery f
i
j if:
{Mi, f ij} ∈ arg max
{Mi∈S,f ij∈Mi}
W (f ij ,Mi|S). (2.2)
The first term of the value function, Eur(f
i
j), is the standard expected utility over
money. The second term is his expectation, over each possible history, of his utility
over talent.11 That is, suppose that the agent has chosen menu and lottery Mi
and f ij , and that the the outcomes {ri1, ..., rini} occur. He therefore has history
H = (ri1, ..., r
i
ni
; f ij ;Mi;S), from which he draws an inference concerning his talent,
given his prior probability pt of having high talent. His ex-post probability of having
high talent is p(t|H), and so his utility over his talent is upt (p(t|H)).
Recall that the agent having utility over talent is not, in itself, an addition to the
standard vNM model. The only difference with the vNM model is that the agent has
11There is an abuse of notation in the value function, in that the rij ’s are not elements of Mi,
rather it is understood that rij is an attainable outcome from lottery f
i
j in menu Mi.
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preferences over whether to observe his talent ex-post. The vNM model corresponds
to the case where the agent is indifferent, while the VUI model corresponds to the
case where the agent is doubt-prone. Yet this difference is sufficient to be the driving
factor for all the results that follow. Notice that the agent’s primitive preferences
do not directly depend on the menu he receives. Any type of menu dependence he
exhibits is therefore a consequence of his preferences over money and self-worth.
The next step is to characterize the structure of the agent’s signal over his talent.
That is, structure must be imposed on p(t|H), the agent’s conditional probability of
his talent, given the history he receives. For ease of exposition, I restrict attention
to a specific signal structure that meets plausible assumptions. Allowing a broader
class of signals would essentially yield the same results with little added intuition,
while complicating the analysis.
2.2.3 Signals of self-worth
I focus here on the link between decision making ability (talent) and the agent’s
reward. This connection could be due to a higher ability at accomplishing a task,
or it could be due to a better intuition over what constitutes a good decision. Both
explanations are consistent with this model. But note that the agent only obtain
signals, he has no mechanism for investing in his talent (self-improve) or manipulate
his beliefs in any way. This assumption is formally written as follows:
Non-manipulability assumption For any set S ∈ 2Lr , any menu Mi ∈ S and any
lottery f ij ∈Mi, the following holds:
pt =
∑
{ri1,...rini}∈Mi
(
p(t|H)
ni∏
h=1
p(rih|f ih)
)
. (2.3)
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The non-manipulability assumption allows the agent’s posterior beliefs to depend
on his ex-post history, but it does not allow his expectation of his talent to be differ-
ent from his prior. In other words, he expects to obtain a Bayesian signal of talent.
Note that the agent makes no inferences from his choice itself. For instance, this
agent cannot follow the reasoning “since I am not even willing to walk into a bar
and talk to a stranger, I could not possibly be a great seducer.”
For the rest of this section, I use as an illustration the set S = {{f, g, h}}, where
f = ($100, 0.45; $50, 0.1; $0, 0.45), g = ($250, 0.2; $0, 0.8) and h =
($50.5, 0.99; $0, 0.01). The agent must choose menu {f, g, h}, and then chooses be-
tween lotteries f , g and h. Suppose throughout the example that the agent chooses
lottery f . In addition to non-manipulability, the signal over the agent’s talent must
satisfy the following properties:
Signal Properties
S.1 The agent views a better outcome from his chosen lottery as a higher signal of his
ability. For instance, the agent’s posterior probability of having high talent th is
higher if he receives $100 than if he receives $50 (recall that he chooses lottery
f), for given outcomes in g and in h. Furthermore, the agent obtains a positive
(negative) signal if the outcome of his chosen lottery is higher (lower) than the
outcome of an unchosen lottery. For example, suppose that the outcomes of f ,
g and h are $50, $0 and $50.5. Then he obtains a positive signal comparing the
$50 he receives to $0, but he receives a negative signal comparing $50 to $50.5.
S.2 If an unchosen lottery has a higher outcome, then it is a lower signal of the
agent’s ability. For example, if the outcome of g is $250, it is a lower signal of
his ability than if the outcome is $0, for a given outcome in f and in h.
S.3 A likely history is less informative than an unlikely one, all else being equal.
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Suppose the agent observes that the outcome of lottery h is $50.5. This out-
come is highly probable (probability 0.99) and therefore should not be very
informative, compared (for instance) with obtaining $50.5 from a lottery h′ =
($50.5, 0.01; $0, 0.99).12
S.4 Unchosen menus are less informative than they would be if they are chosen,
since the agent never observes which outcomes in the unchosen menus occur.
These properties are sufficient for most of the results and intuition in the rest of
this paper. I now focus on a specific signal structure, for which I define additional
notation. Consider two lotteries, f = (r1, p1; ...; rn, pn) and f
′ = (r′1, p
′
1; ...; r
′
n′ , p
′
n′).
Suppose that f does not dominate f ′, i.e. the best outcome in f ′ is better than the
worst outcome in f . I assume that if a lottery strictly dominates another, then there
is no signal to be received from comparing the outcomes. Therefore, there is no
need to consider dominated lotteries, as they are never chosen. If the agent chooses
lottery f , then he receives a positive signal the outcome r in f is higher than the
outcome r′ in f ′. The best signal he receives is when he receives the highest r in f ,
and when r′ in f ′ is the lowest. Define
p∗(ri, rj|f ; f ′) ≡
∑
{r∈f,r′∈f ′}
p(r; f)p(r′; f ′)I{ur(ri)−ur(rj) > ur(r)−ur(r′)}.
p∗(ri, rj|f ; f ′) ≡
∑
{r∈f,r′∈f ′}
p(r; f)p(r′; f ′)I{ur(ri)−ur(rj) < ur(r)−ur(r′)}.
The notation I{} denotes the indicator function, which has value 1 if the statement
in brackets is true and 0 if it is false. Given f and f ′ and outcomes ri and rj, respec-
tively, p∗(ri, rj|f ; f ′) denotes the probability of receiving a worse relative outcome.
That is, p∗ denotes the probability of receiving outcome r in f and r′ in f ′ such
that the difference in utility ur(r) − ur(r′) is smaller than the difference in utility
12Note, however, that a higher outcome is still a higher signal of ability, for any probability. For
instance, the agent has a higher belief of his signal if he receives $100 than if he receives $50, even
though $50 occurs with much smaller probability.
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ur(ri) − ur(rj). Similarly, p∗ denotes the probability of receiving a better relative
outcome. I use p∗ as a weight for positive signals; that is, if there is a high likeli-
hood of getting a good outcome, then it is less informative of the agent’s talent, in
accordance with property S.3. Similarly, I use p∗ as a weight for negative signals.
The signal drawn for unchosen menus is discussed in the appendix, as it is no-
tationally cumbersome. The main assumption is that if the agent does not observe
which outcome of a lottery occurs, then he does not take into account which menu
that lottery is from. For instance, whether lottery g is drawn from menu Mj or
Mk provides the same information if he receives neither menu Mj or Mk. For now,
assume that the set S contains a singleton menu, i.e. S = {{M}}. The agent’s
ex-ante signal structure is as follows, given history H = (r1, ..., rn; fj;M ; {M}):
Signal structure
p(t|H) = pt
(
1 +
∑
k∈{1..n}
bjk
(
ur(rj)− ur(rk)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rj)≥ur(rk)}(p
∗(rj, rk|fj; fk))
−cS
∑
k′∈{1..n}
(
ur(rk′)− ur(rj)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rj)<ur(rk′ )}(p
∗(rj, rk′ |fj; fk′))
)
(2.4)
The values for parameters bjk and cS are chosen to ensure that this signal lies in
the correct domain and satisfies the non-manipulability assumption (see appendix
for details). The joint distribution p(t,H) = p(t|H)p(H) is trivially characterized
from the signal structure. Note also that the agent’s actions do not provide him
with any information in advance, as mentioned previously.
The signal structure is separated in two parts. The first part concerns the positive
signal received by the observed outcomes in the chosen menu. It is relevant when
the utility of the received outcome ur(rj) is higher than the utility of the observed
outcome ur(rk). This signal is weighted by p
∗. Note that if the agent is highly
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likely to receive this relative outcome or better, then he acquires less information
concerning his decision making ability. This corresponds to the signal property S.3.
The second part concerns the negative signal received by the observed outcomes In
this case, the signal is weighted by p∗. Here as well, if the agent is highly likely to
receive a bad relative outcome, then he acquires less negative information concerning
his decision making ability. In addition, it is immediate that properties S.1 and S.2
are satisfied as well. The signal is positive if the outcome received rj is higher than the
observed outcome rk, and it increases as ur(rj) − ur(rk) increases. This completes
the discussion of the signal structure, and we are now in position to analyze the
results.
2.3 Implications of doubt-proneness
This section analyzes three behavioral patterns that are accommodated with this
model, namely the Dutch lottery example, the common ration effect, and the the
status quo bias. In most of the examples that follow, there exists a degenerate
safe lottery g = (r, 1). While this allows for easier exposition, none of these results
depend on a g being degenerate. For instance, g = (r+ ε, 0.5; 4− ε, 0.5) would yield
the same results, for small enough ε.
2.3.1 Dutch lottery Example
Returning first to Zeelenberg’s (1999) Dutch lottery example, the setup of the lotter-
ies falls within this setting. That is, denote the risky lottery f = (rh, p; rl, 1−p) and
the safe lottery g = (r, 1). The risky lottery f could lead to a high outcome rh with
probability p, or to the lower one rl (the negative cost of the ticket) with probability
1− p. The feedback case, where the agent is forced to observe the resolution of the
lottery, corresponds to the set S = {{f, g}}. The agent trivially chooses menu {f, g},
and then expects to observe the resolution of the risky lottery f , whether he chooses
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Initial Set Chosen menu Chosen lottery
Feedback: S = {{f, g}} {f, g} f
No feedback: S ′ = {{f}, {g}} {g} g
Table 2.2: Dutch lottery example.
it or not. The no-feedback case, where the agent does not observe the resolution of
f if he does not purchase the ticket, is written S ′ = {{f}, {g}}. Suppose that the
agent chooses menu {f} (and subsequently lottery f). If he chooses menu {g} from
set S ′, then he does not observe the outcome of the risky lottery.13
In the standard EU case, the agent who chooses lottery f (after choosing menu
{f}) from the feedback set S should also choose lottery f from the no-feedback set
S ′. But this need not be the case in the VUI model. This framework allows the
agent to choose g in the feedback case and f in the no-feedback case, as in table
2.2. Note that lottery g is more informative if it is drawn from set S than it is
when drawn from S ′. In comparison, lottery f is exactly as informative whether it is
drawn from the set S or S ′, since in either case the agent knows that his prize would
have been r if he had chosen lottery g. It is therefore possible for a doubt-prone
agent to choose lottery g in the no-feedback case to switch to preferring risky lottery
f in the feedback case. This allows him to avoid acquiring information about his
decision making ability. Notice that it is clear here that a doubt-prone agent would
not switch preferences in the other direction, i.e. from f in the no-feedback case to
g in the feedback case. It may not be immediately clear, using only a general notion
of regret, which of the decisions the agent anticipates regretting more; in this setting
there is no such confusion, given his doubt attitude.
Consider the special case where p = 0.5 and r = rCE, the certainty equivalent of
lottery f . That is, rCE is the value for which ur(rCE) = 0.5ur(rh) + 0.5ur(rl). In
this case, the doubt-prone agent is indifferent between receiving f and g = (rCE, 1)
in the feedback case, as they are equally informative and have equal expected utility
13If the agent has the choice between observing and not observing the resolution of the risky
lottery, then the set Ŝ = {{f}, {g}, {f, g}}.
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valuations over money. However, he strictly prefers receiving lottery g (i.e. his
certainty equivalent) in the no-feedback case than lottery f . This result is formally
proven in the appendix.
2.3.2 Common ratio effect
Consider again the no-feedback case S ′ = {{f}, {g}}. Now let r = $200, p = 0.8,
rh = $300 and rl = 0, so that f = ($300, 0.8; $0, 0.2) and g = ($200, 1) . Compare
this to a second no-feedback case, S̃ = {{f̃}, {g̃}}, where f̃ = ($300, 0.4; $0, 0.6) and
g̃ = ($200, 0.5; $0, 0.5). In case S ′, lottery f is more informative than g. If the agent
chooses f (after choosing menu {f}), he still knows the outcome of g would have
been r. If instead he chooses g, he obtains exactly the outcome that he expects.
Since he does not observe the resolution of f , he acquires no new information. A
doubt-prone agent may therefore take this reasoning into account when choosing
g. In the case S̃, it is less clear whether f̃ is more informative than g̃, since he
does not observe the resolution of the other lottery in either case. In any case, the
difference in informativeness between f̃ and g̃ in set S̃ is smaller than the difference
in informativeness between f and g in S ′. Therefore, the same doubt-prone agent
who chooses g in S ′ to avoid information may now switch to f̃ in S̃ (table 2.3).
These numbers and choices correspond exactly to Gul’s (1991) version of the Al-
lais Paradox (also known as the common consequence or as the common ratio effect,
see Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), which motivates his model of disappointment
aversion. Note that these choices cannot be explained using the standard vNM
model, in which the agent who chooses lottery g in S ′ also chooses lottery g̃ in S̃.
Yet they are entirely consistent in this model, and may in fact appear very plausible.
Notice that the set S = {{f, g}} corresponds to a Dutch lottery, and that an indi-
vidual may choose lottery f in S, even if he chooses g in S ′. Whether this pattern
holds for this specific example could be tested in an experimental setting.
Consider now the well-known criticism of the rationality of Allais preferences.
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Initial Set Chosen menu Chosen lottery
No feedback: S ′ = {{f}, {g}} {g} g
No feedback: S̃ = {{f̃}, {g̃})} {f̃} {f̃}
Table 2.3: Common Ratio Effect.
Suppose that a fair coin is tossed. Then:
(i) If the coin lands heads, the individual receives $0. Otherwise, he receives lottery
f = ($300, 0.5; $0, 0.5), which then resolves.
(ii) If the same coin lands heads, then the individual still receives $0. Otherwise,
he receives g = ($200, 1).
Notice that the probabilities of each prize for choice (i) are the same as in lottery
f̃ , and similarly for choice (ii) and lottery g̃. It may seem that the Allais prefer-
ences indicate that the agent prefers choice (i) to (ii) ex-ante, but then switches to
preferring choice (ii) once the coin lands heads.14 But this is not the case in this
model. The agent expects to observe whether the coin lands heads or tails regardless
of his choice. This corresponds to set S ′, provided that he does not observe the final
resolution of g in choice (ii). Therefore, the agent who prefers g in S ′ still prefers
choice (ii) here, both ex-ante and ex-post, even if he chooses f̃ in set S̃.15
2.3.3 Status quo bias
This model accommodates the status quo bias using the same reasoning as for the
explanation of the common ratio effect and the Dutch lottery. As an illustration,
consider again lottery f = (rh, p; rl, 1 − p), and let lottery f ′ = (r′h, p′; r′l, 1 − p′).
Suppose that the expected utility over money is identical for f and f ′:
14See Segal (1990) for the counterargument that these preferences are not implied unless the
reduction axiom holds. I present a different counterargument here, which is closely related to the
regret explanation by Loomes and Sugden (1982) of the isolation effect in two-stage gambles. The
intuition of their argument is essentially the same.
15The objects used in this section do not formally allow a correlation between lotteries’ resolu-
tions. The extension is straightforward, although the notation is cumbersome.
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pur(rh) + (1− p)ur(rl) = p′ur(r′h) + (1− p′)ur(r′l).
Consider two cases:
(i) The agent receives lottery f , and before observing its outcome, is asked whether
he would exchange it for lottery f ′.
(ii) The agent receives lottery f ′, and is asked, before it resolves, whether he would
exchange it for lottery f .
In the vNM framework, the agent is indifferent, in either case, between keeping
his current endowment and switching. But there is strong empirical evidence that
individuals often strictly prefer to keep their current allocation. This result is known
as the status quo bias. It is consistent with the VUI model if the following assump-
tion is made: the agent believes that he must observe the outcome of the lottery
he receives. The weaker assumption that the agent is more likely to observe the
outcome also suffices, but it is outside the scope of the present analysis. Given this
assumption, the two cases can be written as follows:
(i) Set S = {{f, f ′}, {f}}. Keeping the current allocation corresponds to choosing
menu {f} and lottery f . Switching lotteries corresponds to choosing menu
{f, f ′} and receiving lottery f ′.
(ii) Set S̃ = {{f, f ′}, {f ′}}. Keeping the current allocation corresponds to choosing
menu {f ′} and lottery f . Switching lotteries corresponds to choosing menu
{f, f ′} and receiving lottery f .
It is clear that in both cases, a doubt-prone agent strictly prefers to keep his
current endowment. The two lotteries yield the same expected utility over money,
while switching lotteries provides more information on his decision making ability,
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Initial Set Chosen menu Chosen lottery
Feedback: S = {{f, f ′}, {f}} {f} f
No feedback: S̃ = {{f, f ′; }, {f ′}} {f ′} f ′
Table 2.4: Status quo bias.
which he would rather avoid (table 2.4). Note that once again, this result is not only
consistent with the VUI model, it is in fact expected.
While the reasoning used here is consistent with the status quo bias for this
specific case, there are other settings in which the predictions of this model depart
from the implications of the status quo bias. I present an example of this divergence
in the next section.
2.4 Safe allocation bias
This section places the the agent in a financial setting in which he chooses whether
to buy an asset, to sell it short or to hold a zero position. I show that there is a bias
towards the (safe) zero position. I specifically use the example analyzed by Dow and
Werlang (1992), as it fits naturally to this setting. Suppose that there is one unit of
an asset, at price P . I assume that the agent places probability q that the value of
the asset will be rh and probability 1− q that the value of the asset will be rl.
If the agent chooses to buy the asset, then he receives rh−P (the good outcome)
with probability q and rl − P with probability 1 − q. This corresponds to lottery
fb = (rh − P, q; rl − P, 1 − q). If instead he chooses to sell the asset short, then he
receives P − rh (in this case, the bad outcome) with probability q and P − rl with
probability 1− q. This corresponds to lottery fs = (P − rh, q;P − rl, 1− q). Holding
no position corresponds to lottery g = (0, 1). Suppose that there exists some price
P for which rh − P > 0 > rl − P .
As noted by Dow and Werlang, the standard vNM model with (local) risk-
neutrality predicts that there is a unique P ∗ such that the agent buys the asset
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(chooses fb) if P < P
∗, sells it short fs if P > P
∗, and takes no position (g) (or is
indifferent) otherwise. With a notion of ambiguity aversion, there is instead a price
interval [PB, PG] at which the agent chooses the zero position. He buys the asset
for price P < PB, and sells the asset for price P > PG. The key behind Dow and
Werlang’s result is that under ambiguity aversion, the probabilities add up to less
than 1.16 That is, instead of q and 1 − q, the agent effectively places probability
qh and ql, with qh + ql < 1. Note that his result is different from what would be
obtained with the status quo bias or a transaction cost: in those cases, the agent
would be biased towards his current portfolio, which need not be the zero position.
This framework yields the same result as Dow and Werlang’s, but here the prob-
abilities add up to 1. That is, the agent places probability q that the value of the
asset will be rh and probability 1 − q that the value of the asset will be rl. The
reasoning is the same as in the previous sections; the agent does not observe the
outcome of the asset unless he chooses to buy it or sell it short. The agent’s choice
corresponds to set S = {{fb, fs}, g}. Note that if he buys (sells) the the asset (fb),
he is certain what he would have received had he sold (bought) the asset (fg), and
he is also certain of what he would have received if he had kept the safe allocation
(g).17 In contrast, if he chooses g, he does not observe the resolution of fb or fs, and
so obtains less information on his decision making ability. Therefore, there is a price
interval [PB, PG] at which the agent prefers g to both fb and fs. For a low enough
price P < PB, he prefers fb, and for a high enough price P > PG, he prefers fs. This
result is formally proven in the appendix.
Note that this result holds even though the agent is risk-neutral. We can take the
zero position g to mean a safe portfolio of bonds, and fb and fs to be risky stocks.
It is clear, by the same reasoning, that although the agent is risk-neutral, there is
still an equity premium.
16See, for instance, Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
17Technically, choice S is not identical to his choice, since the two lotteries are correlated; there
is no history for which outcome rh − P from fb and outcome rl − P from f − s can occur. This
framework can be adapted in a straightforward fashion to allow for this correlation.
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2.4.1 Relation to ambiguity
It is perhaps surprising that there is overlap between the predictions of this frame-
work and those obtained by taking into account ambiguity aversion. My aim here
is to elucidate this connection by focusing on a variation of Ellsberg’s paradox. The
argument is not formal, and only relies on similarities.
In an experiment by Halevy (2007), there are four different urns, U1, U2, U3 and
U4, each with 10 balls:
(i) Urn U1 has 5 red balls and 5 black balls.
(ii) The distribution of red and black balls in urn U2 is unknown.
(iii) The number of red balls in U3 is uniformly distributed between 0 and 10.
(iv) There are 10 red balls with probability 0.5 and 10 black balls with probability
0.5.
Suppose now that the agent is presented with an urn from which one ball is drawn,
and must choose a color. If a ball of that color is drawn, he receives $2. He is asked
which urn he prefers. The only urn in which there is ‘ambiguity’ is urn U2, since
the probabilities are objective in lotteries U1, U3 and U4. Ignoring urn U2, the
agent, according to the standard vNM model, should be indifferent between urns
U1, U3 and U4. Instead, Halevy (2007) finds that two patterns emerge, with even
frequency: the first group is indifferent between urns U1 and U4, but ranks urn U3
as worse. The second group prefers urn U1 to U3 to U4. Both groups act in a way
that is inconsistent with the vNM model; I focus here only on the second group.
There is perhaps a ‘flavor’ of ambiguity in urn U4, which motivates why the agent
prefers U1 to U4, even without ambiguity. But the interpretation is difficult from a
rigorous ambiguity viewpoint, since probabilities are objective both for urn U1 and
urn U4 (it is consistent, however, with a violation of the reduction axiom, see Segal
(1990)). This framework can account for the second group’s preferences, but not
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the first. It depends, however, on the exact setup of the experiment. Consider the
following two alternatives:
1. All the lotteries have taken place, but the agent does not know the results yet.
2. The number of balls in urns U3 and U4 has already been determined, but has
not been shown to the agent. For urn 3, if the agent chooses the color black,
the second draw (the draw of the ball from the urn) occurs after 3 seconds. If
he chooses the color red, then the draw occurs after 4 seconds. In other words,
a different randomizing device is used, and these draws are uncorrelated.
3. None the lotteries have taken place, and a different randomizing device is used
for each draw and for each stage.
For case 1, this framework makes the same prediction as the vNM model that
the agent is indifferent between urns U1, U3 and U4. Since this framework does
not distinguish between one-stage lotteries and compound lotteries, all three urns
corresponds to set S1 = {{f, f ′}}, where f = f ′ = {$2, 0.5; $0, 0.5}. For any of
these lotteries, if the agent observes black and loses (wins), he knows that he would
have won (lost) had he chosen red.18 The same holds for case 3, in which, the agent
has no information on whether he would have won; the urns now correspond to set
S3 = {{f}, {f ′}}. Observing that he drew a black ball does not imply that he should
have chosen red, since he has no information on whether red would have occurred
had he chosen it. This situation is akin to having a choice between two roulette
wheels; observing the black ball as the outcome of one roulette wheel does not imply
that red would have occurred in the other.
This framework, however, does not predict that the agent is indifferent between
urns U1, U3 and U4 in case 2. Instead, the agent strictly prefers U1 to U4 to U3,
18Some histories cannot occur, such as history H = ($20, $20; f ; {f, f ′};S), because of the cor-
relation between lotteries. As mentioned previously, while this framework does not account for
a correlation between lotteries, it can be adapted in a straightforward manner. Similarly, lottery
f and f ′, strictly speaking, should not be identical; this can also be incorporated in the model.
Alternatively, we could allow f ′ to vary slightly from f .
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which matches exactly the second group in Halevy’s experimental findings. The
reason is the following: urn U1 corresponds to set S3 = {{f}, {f ′}}, as in case 3.
But urn U4 corresponds to set S1 = {{f, f ′}}, as in case 1. The agent prefers the
least possible information on his decision making ability, and therefore prefers urn
U1. Formally, given set S = {{f, f ′}, {{f}, {f ′}}, the agent prefers menu {f} (or
{f ′}).19
2.5 Revealed Preferences
This section analyzes the strong connection between the agent’s preferences for
smaller menus and his doubt-proneness are strongly connected. I then show that
the agent’s utility over money can be recovered from the agents choices. My aim
in presenting these results is twofold. First, these results provide testable implica-
tions for this model. Second, the ability to extract the agent’s utility over money
from utility over self-worth demonstrates that these two dimensions of preference
are distinct and empirically separable from each other.
Consider the sets S = {{f, g}}, S ′ = {{f, g, h}} and S ′′ = {{f, g}, {f, g, h}}.
Given set S, suppose that the agent chooses {{f, g}, f}. That is, he trivially
chooses menu {f, g}, and subsequently chooses lottery f . Given set S ′, he chooses
{{f, g, h}, {f}}. In the vNM case (and in fact, in most models where the agent’s
primitive preferences are over lotteries over outcomes), the agent also chooses lottery
f in set S ′′. He is indifferent between receiving menus {f, g} and {f, g, h}, since his
choice of lottery is the same in both cases.
In this model, he is no longer indifferent between the two menus. Given set
S ′′, a doubt-prone agent chooses {{f, g}, f}. He strictly prefers the smaller menu
{f, g}, even though he makes the same choice of lottery f .20 Intuitively, he obtains
19See Loomes and Sugden (1982) for a discussion of the correlation between states of the world
in a model of regret.
20This reasoning assumes h is not a degenerate lottery. If h is a degenerate lottery, then he is
indifferent between receiving menus {f, g} and {f, g, h}, since he is certain of the outcome of h in
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more information about his self-image if there are more lotteries in his menu. He
still obtains information from the unchosen menu, but less than he does from the
outcomes he observes, as stated in signal property S.4. This result is formalized in
theorem 1. Let CS(S) denote the choice of menu from S, and let CM(M |S) denote
the choice of lottery from menu M , given initial set S.
Theorem 2.1: Preference for smaller menus. Suppose that the agent is strictly
doubt-prone. Take any S = {M1,M2, ...Mn}, where M1 ⊂ M2... ⊂ Mn, and where
no lottery is degenerate. In addition, CM(M1|{Mi}) = CM(M2|{Mj}) =
... = CM(Mn|{Mn}). Then the agent strictly prefers the smallest menu M1 in S, i.e.
CS(S) = M1. Furthermore, he chooses lottery CM(M1|S) = CM(M1|{Mi}).
The reason for the condition that no lottery is degenerate is that degenerate
lotteries are equally informative whether they are chosen or unchosen. The next
theorem answers the concern over whether doubt-proneness over self-image can be
separated from preferences over the financial reward. Theorem 2 demonstrates that
the agent’s choices allow us to precisely characterize his utility function ur.
21
Theorem 2.2: Charactizerization of utility over money. Function ur can be
uniquely characterized from the agent’s choices, up to positive affine transformation.
The precise mechanism for eliciting function ur is described in the appendix.
An implication of theorem 2 is that we can isolate the effect of the agent’s doubt-
proneness, even though the object over which he is doubt-prone, talent, is never
observed. That is, we can study the exact tradeoff between the agent’s expected
utility over money and his doubt-proneness, if we have collect enough data on his
decisions.
either case.
21See the appendix for a more rigorous version of theorem 2.
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2.6 Games with uncertainty
In this section, I revisit the two games mentioned in the introduction, namely Zee-
lenberg and Beattie’s (1997) ultimatum game and Dana, Weber and Kuang’s (2007)
dictator game. Neither of these settings is actually a game: the amount that the re-
cipient in Zeelenberg and Beattie’s game is predetermined, and the recipient does not
play a role in the dictator game. The analysis of the two examples is straightforward.
There are two separate cases in the ultimatum game: in case (i), the player
making an offer will be told ex-post the exact amount that the recipient would have
accepted. In case (ii), the player is not told the amount. Zeelenberg and Beattie
(1997) find that players in case (i) make a less generous offer, on average, than players
in case (ii). The reasoning used throughout previously in this paper applies here as
well: there is an asymmetry between the informativeness of each choice in case (i)
compared to case (ii). Suppose, for instance, that the agent can split $10 dollars in
two ways: he can either (a) keep $8 dollars for himself and $2 for the recipient or (b)
split it equally, and they each receive $5 or he can . He places probability 0.5 that the
recipient accepts $2 dollars, but he is certain that the recipient always accepts $5$.
Suppose that the dictator is not altruistic, that is, his utility does not depend on
the recipient’s monetary reward. Then this corresponds exactly to the Dutch lottery
example: in case (i), the agent’s set is S = {{f, g}}, where f = ($8, 0.5; 0, 0.2) and
g = ($5, 1), and in case (ii), the set is S ′ = {{f}, {g}} (table 2.2). Once again, the
reason that an agent may choose f in case S but switch to g in case S ′ is not that
he anticipates ‘regretting’ his decision in set S if he picks g and realizes f would
have been acceptable. Rather, he avoids f in set S ′ because of how informative it
is, since he knows what he would have received, had he chosen g. In set S, however,
he observes the resolutions of both f and g, and so the difference in informativeness
between the two lotteries is smaller.
Dana, Weber and Kuang’s (2007) dictator game, however, requires an adaption
of this framework. In a dictator game, the recipient does not have the possibility to
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Box A Dictator: 6
Recipient: 1
Box B Dictator: 5
Recipient: 5
Table 2.5: Baseline Case.
Heads Tails
Box A Dictator: 6 Dictator: 6
Recipient: 1 Recipient: 5
Box B Dictator: 5 Dictator: 5
Recipient: 5 Recipient 1
Table 2.6: Baseline Case.
refuse the offer. The dictator must therefore have a reason to share the endowment,
otherwise he would not take into account what the recipient receives. Consider the
setup used by Dana, Weber and Kuang. The dictator has a choice between two
options, A and B. In case (i), the ‘baseline’ case, (table 2.5), there is no uncertainty;
if he chooses option A then he receives $6 and the recipient receives $1. If instead he
chooses option B, then both he and the recipient receive $5. In case (ii), the ‘hidden
information’ case (table 2.6), he still receives $6 he chooses A, and he still receives
$5 if he chooses B. But now, the recipient’s allocation is determined by a coin toss,
prior to the dictator’s choice. If it lands heads, then the recipient’s allocation is
$1 for option A and $5 in option B, and if it lands tails then it is the other way
around. The dictator has the choice, before making his decision, to observe the coin
toss at no cost. Otherwise, he never observes what the recipient receives. As for the
recipient, he does not find out whether or not the dictator has seen the outcome of
the coin toss.
A significant number of dictators choose not to observe the outcome of the coin
toss in the hidden information case, and are more likely to choose option A ; on
average more agents choose option A in this setup then in the baseline case (thereby
giving the recipient a smaller share, on average). Notice that this behavior is in-
consistent with both altruism and self-interested behavior: if the agents are indeed
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self-interested, then they should always choose option A, even in the case without
uncertainty. If they are altruistic, then they should strictly prefer to observe the
coin toss before making the decision.
If the agent’s self-image is fixed, as I have assumed throughout this paper, then
in fact it will not be affected by whether he makes the generous offer for certain ($5
for the recipient) or the selfish one ($1 for himself). I instead assume that the agent
believes that there is a moral action and an immoral action, and that the action
itself has a benefit or a cost. That is, his self-image is higher if he acts morally
(giving the recipient $5), and lower if he acts immorally (giving the recipient $1.
This is indistinguishable from assuming that he prefers the recipient to receive $5
or $1. Suppose that giving the recipient $5 raises his self-image to t for certain, and
giving him $1 lowers it to t for certain. Recall that utility over self-image is denoted
upt(p), where p is the probability of having self-image t.
Consider first a dictator weakly prefers option A. Then ur(6) + upt(1) ≥ ur(5) +
upt(0). Equivalently, the difference in his utility over money between options A and
B is greater than the difference between his utility over self-image: ur(6)− ur(5) ≥
w(1) − upt(0). In case (ii), in which there is uncertainty, if this dictator chooses to
observe the outcome of the coin toss before making his decision, he also still chooses
option A. If instead, he chooses not to observe the outcome of the coin toss, then he
still chooses option A, since he obtains more for himself, and the recipient receives
the same on average as in option B. He therefore prefers to observe the outcome of
the coin toss if:
ur(6) + 0.5 (upt(1) + upt(0)) > ur(6) + upt(0.5). (2.5)
But since w is strictly concave, this conditions never holds. He therefore strictly
prefers not to observe the coin toss, and to choose A for certain (denote this agent
‘type AA’).
Now consider a dictator who strictly prefers option B in case (i). Then ur(6) −
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ur(5) < upt(1)− upt(0). In case (ii), if he chooses to observe the outcome of the coin
toss, then his expected utility is: 0.5 (ur(6) + ur(5)) + upt(1). If he chooses not to
observe the outcome, then he prefers option A, and his utility is ur(6) + upt(0.5).
This dictator chooses not to observe the outcome of the coin toss if:
ur(6) + upt(0.5) > 0.5 (ur(6) + ur(5)) + upt(1)
=⇒ 0.5(ur(6)− ur(0.5)) > upt(1)− upt(0.5). (2.6)
Together, these conditions imply that
0.5 (upt(1) + upt(0)) < upt(0.5). (2.7)
Since the agent is doubt-prone (upt is concave), this condition can hold (I denote
those for whom it holds type BA, and those for whom it does not type BB). Note
that it could not hold if the agent were doubt-neutral or doubt-averse. Summarizing,
there are three possible types of dictators:
• Type AA: Dictators who choose A in both case (i) and case (ii). They must
also prefer not to observe the outcome of the coin toss.
• Type BA: Dictators who choose B in case (i), avoid observing the outcome of
the coin toss, and choose A in case (ii).
• Type B: Dictators who choose B in case (i), observe the outcome of the coin
toss, and choose whichever option provides the recipient with $5.
This framework does not allow dictators who choose to observe the outcome of the
coin toss and still choose the option for which the recipient receives $1 . It also does
not allow dictators not to observe the outcome and then choose option B.
The predictions of this model seem to fit the data well (table 2 in Dana, Weber
and Kuang (2007)): of the 32 dictators, 14 (44%) chose not to observe the outcome
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of the coin toss. Of those 14 individuals, 12 (86%) chose option A (consistent with
types I and II).22 Of the 18 individuals who chose to observe the coin toss, 15 (83%)
chose the option for which the recipient receives $5 (consistent with type III).23 Note
that types I and II are conflated in case (ii), and that we expect more individuals
(those of type II) to choose the fair allocation in case (i). This pattern also emerges:
in case (i), 14 out of 19 (74%) choose B, compared to 6 out of 16 (38%) who choose
the fair option in case (ii).24
2.7 Closing remarks
I have shown in this paper that taking into account preferences for avoiding infor-
mation relevant to self-worth can accommodate a number of empirical findings. In
addition, this framework serves as a link between different branches of the literature,
namely models of anticipated regret, models of self-image and models in which the
agent has a bias towards a reference point. The agent’s objective is to preserve his
self-image; that is, he wishes to acquire the least amount of information concern-
ing his decision making ability. In this sense, the agent’s bias is towards remaining
as close to his prior as possible. The same reasoning can be used in Dana, We-
ber and Kuang’s (2007) dictator game with uncertainty. Their empirical findings
seem at odds with both self-interested preferences and altruistic preferences, but the
predictions of this framework appear to fit the data well.
I conclude with the observation that individuals sometimes seek information over
self-image, rather than avoid it. For example, part of the appeal of gossip, arguably,
is to compare oneself with others. Sports, games and other forms of competition serve
as forums for obtaining a more precise signal of one’s ability in different fields. I have
22Note that the 2 individuals who chose option B are receiving less for themselves, and are leaving
less for the recipient, on average, than if they observed the outcome.
23One agent chose a smaller allocation both for the recipient and for himself.
24It is also the case that 13 out of 16 (81%) choose A when the dictator receives $6 and the
recipient receives $5, but here the self-interested choice cannot be disentangled from the moral
choice.
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ignored the notion of doubt-aversion (or curiosity) in this paper, but an extension
of this model could allow agents’ attitude towards doubt to vary. In particular,
we could consider an economy in which agents have the same prior self-image but
heterogeneous degrees of curiosity. Intuitively, a higher degree in curiosity may
confer an advantage to otherwise identical agents.
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Appendix A
Appendix A
The appendix is structured as follows. Part 1 explains why the standard EU model is
inappropriate when the agent does not expect to observe the resolution of uncertainty.
Part 2 provides an example of the ‘preservation of self-image’ application. All the proofs
are in part 3.
A.1 Limitations of the standard EU model
This example illustrates the problem with using the standard vNM EU model when there
are outcomes that the agent never expects to observe. Consider the simple case of an agent
who has performed a task and does not know how well he has done. There are no future
decisions that depend on his performance. For example, as a simple adaptation of Savage’s
omelet, suppose that the agent does not know whether he has fed his guests a good omelet
or a bad one. With probability pt, he has done well (t), and with probability (1 − pt) he
has done badly (t). He prefers having done well to having done badly, although this will
have no future repercussions. Given the choice between remaining forever in doubt (D)
and perfectly resolving the uncertainty, (ND), it might appear that he compares:
UD = ptu(t) + (1− pt)u(t)
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to
UND = ptu(t) + (1− pt)u(t)
and that since UD = UND, he is indifferent. But UD is not necessarily the right function to
use if he chooses to remain in doubt, because from his frame of reference the final outcome
will not be t or t. That is, he does not expect to ‘obtain’ ex-post utility u(t) or u(t) because
he does not expect to observe either t or t. As it is not clear what his perception of the
consequence is if he does not expect the uncertainty to be resolved (from his viewpoint),
his expected utility is undetermined. In its current form, the standard EU model does not
offer a method for evaluating this choice. Using UD effectively ignores that the relevant
frame of reference is the agent’s, not the modeler’s.1
Redefining the outcome space to include the observation itself does not eliminate the
problem. Suppose that the outcome space is taken to be Z = {tD, tD, tND, tND} where tD
represents the outcome that he did well but doubts it, tND that he did well and does not
doubt it, and so forth. He therefore compares the following:
UD = ptu(tD) + (1− pt)u(tD)
to
UND = ptu(tND) + (1− pt)u(tND)
It is difficult to interpret the meaning of the consequence ‘did well, but doubts it’ from his
frame of reference, since it is not clear what it means to be in doubt if he knows that he
has done well. In addition, his preferences over tD and tD are completely pinned down.
Consider the two extremes, pt = 1 and pt = 0. When pt = 1, there is no intrinsic difference
between UD and UND, since he knows that he has done well. Hence, u(tD) = u(tND).
Similarly, when pt = 0, he knows he has done badly, and so u(tD) = u(tND). It then follows
that UD = UND for any pt ∈ [0, 1]. This definition of the outcome space is essentially the
same as simply Z = {t, t}. His indifference between remaining in doubt and not remaining
1This issue is not resolved by starting with preferences over lotteries as primitives. In the
standard framework, the agent has primitive preferences over lotteries over outcomes, and he is not
allowed to choose between lotteries whose resolution he observes and lotteries whose resolution he
does not observe. He is therefore not given the option to express those preferences.
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in doubt is a consequence of following this approach, it is not implicit from the standard
EU model.
Redefining the outcome space so that his utility is constant if he remains in doubt is
even more problematic. Suppose that Z = {tND, tND, D}, letting tND be the outcome
‘talented and he does not remain in doubt (he observes the outcome)’, TND be the outcome
‘untalented and he observes it’, and letting D mean that he does not observe the outcome,
hence remaining in doubt. He now compares:
UD = u(D)
to
UND = ptu(tND) + (1− pt)u(tND)
However, in the limit pt → 1, UD should approach UND, which only occurs if u(D) =
u(tND). But in that case, as pt → 0, UD does not approach UND, and so there is an
unavoidable discontinuity.
A.2 Applications
Numerical Example (Preservation of Self-image)
The following is a more general version of the numerical example provided in the main
body of the paper. Suppose he puts in effort e ∈ [0, 1], and obtains reward m ∈ [0, 100].
He also has an unobserved talent t ∈ [0, 1] . The agent is doubt-prone and risk-averse for
both resolved and unresolved lotteries on talent. Specifically, u = at1/2 for some a > 0,
and v = t. His expected utility of money is linearly separable from his utility of talent,
and is equal to his expected reward Em. He therefore maximizes:
W̃ (e) = Em(e)− C(e)
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where C(e) ≡ u
(
v−1(Ev(t))
)
−
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e))
The agent’s prior is q that talent t = 0, and 1 − q that talent t = 1. He can put in
level e ∈ [e, e]. Given that he has talent t = 1 or t = 0 and puts in effort e, his re-
spective probabilities of obtaining monetary reward m = 100 are p(100|t = 1, e) = e and
p(100|t = 0, e) = be, for b ∈ [0, 1).
Note that the ostrich effort e0 in this example is e = 0, since he is certain to obtain m = 0,
independently of his talent. It follows from the probabilities given above that:
p($0|1, e) = 1− e
p($0|0, e) = 1− be
p(100|e) = e(q + b(1− q)
p($0|e) = 1− e(q + b(1− q))
p(1|100, e) = q
q + b(1− q)
Solving:
W (e) = 100 ∗ p(100|e) + a
(
p(0|e)p(t)p(0|t, e)
)1/2
+ a
(
p(100|e)p(t)p(100|t, e)
)1/2
= e(100β + a(βq)1/2) + aq1/2
(
1− e(1 + β) + βe2
)1/2
where β = q+ b(1− q). Let γ = 100β + a(βq)1/2, and D = 4γ2
a2q
. Then, from the first order
conditions, we obtain:
e2(βC − 4β2) + e(4β − C)(1 + β) + C − (1 + β)2 = 0
The example in the text corresponds to the case b = 0, q = 1/2, and so β = 1/2, γ = 50+ a2 ,
and d = 2D =
(
200
a + 2
)2
.
A.3 Proofs
Lemma 1 (Informed certainty equivalent). Proof. Define N in the same way as in
the text, i.e. δf  δf ′ ⇔ f N f ′ (and similarly for ∼N , N ). Note that N inherits
continuity, and so there exists a function H : L0 → Z such that δH(f) ∼N f for all f ∈ L0.
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By the certainty axiom A.3, it follows that δH(f) ∼ δδH(f) . Hence δH(f) ∼ δf .
Main Representation Theorem. Proof. Let
X = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m). By lemma 1, δf ∼ δH(f) for any
f ∈ L0. Hence, by a well-known implication of the independence axiom A.4, X ∼ X̃,
where X̃ = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; H(f1), q
N
1 ;H(f2), q
N
2 ; ...;H(fm), q
N
m), and so X ∼ X̃.
Defining Ỹ similarly, Y ∼ Ỹ . By transitivity, X  Y ⇒ X̃  Ỹ . Note that all lotteries X̃
and Ỹ are one-stage lotteries, with final outcomes as prizes. Define the preference relation
I in the following way: X  Y ⇒ X̃ I Ỹ . All the EU axioms hold on I , and so
X̃  Ỹ if and only if W (X̃) > W (Ỹ ), where
W (X̃) =
n∑
i=1
qIi u(zi) +
m∑
i=1
qNi u (H(fzi))
and W is unique up to positive affine transformation. But since X  Y ⇒ X̃  Ỹ , it
follows that X  Y if and only if W (X̃) > W (Ỹ ).
To obtain the representation of H: axioms A.1-A.4 imply that N is a weak order and
that Jensen-continuity holds. The proof for the RDU representation of N then follows
from Wakker (1994). Then, for any f ∈ L0, δH(f) ∼N f . Since w(1) = 1, it follows
that v(H(f)) = v−1 (VRDU (f)), and hence H(f) = v
−1 (VRDU (f)), which completes the
proof.
Theorem 2. Proof. Case 1 is shown below, and case 2 can be proven in a similar way
(by changing all the signs). Suppose RDU holds for N .
There are two cases two consider:
(a) f, f ′ have more than 2 elements:
Let f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f
′ = (z1, p1; ...z
′
i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈
L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1). Suppose that, for some a ∈ (0, 1)
and some z ∈ (z′i, z′i+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
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Since RDU holds:
f ∼N f ′ ⇒ VRDU (f) = VRDU (f ′)
⇒ v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(p∗i )[v(zi)− v(zi−1)] + w(p∗i+1)[v(zi+1)− v(zi)]
+w(p∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(zi+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] =
v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(p∗i )[v(z′i)− v(zi−1)] + w(p∗i+1)[v(z′i+1)− v(z′i)]
+w(p∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(z′i+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)]
⇒ w(p
∗
i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
=
v(z′i)− v(zi)
v(zi+1)− v(z′i+1)
(A.1)
Note that af + (1 − a)δz = (z1, ap1; ...zi; api; z, 1 − a; zi+1, api+1; ...; zn, apn), where
the ranking of z is due to z ∈ (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1). Similarly, af ′ + (1 − a)δz =
(z1, ap1; ...z
′
i; api; z, 1− a; z′i+1, api+1; ...; zn, apn). Using the condition
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
it follows that
⇒ v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(ap∗j + 1− a)[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(ap∗i + 1− a)[v(zi)− v(zi−1)]
+w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)[v(z)− v(zi)] + w(ap∗i+1)[v(zi+1)− v(z)]
+w(ap∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(zi+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(ap∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] ≥
v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(ap∗j + 1− a)[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(ap∗i + 1− a)[v(z′i)− v(zi−1)]
+w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)[v(z)− v(z′i)] + w(ap∗i+1)[v(z′i+1)− v(z)]
+w(ap∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(z′i+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(ap∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)]
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⇒ w(ap
∗
i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
≥ v(z
′
i)− v(zi)
v(zi+1)− v(z′i+1)
(A.2)
Combining (1) and (2), we obtain:
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
≥ w(p
∗
i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(A.3)
Note that this does not depend on the utility function v, but only on the weighting
function w. Take any f̃ = (z̃1, p1; ...z̃i; pi; z̃i+1, pi+1; ...; z̃n, pn),
f̃ ′ = (z̃1, p1; ...z̃
′
i; pi; z̃
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; z̃n, pn) and z̃ such that z̃ ∈ (z̃′i, z̃′i+1) ⊂ (z̃i, z̃i+1).
It must be that af̃ + (1 − a)δz̃ N af̃ ′ + (1 − a)δz̃. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that
af̃ ′+(1−a)δz̃ N af̃+(1−a)δz̃. Then, redoing a similar calculation to the one above,
we obtain:
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
<
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(A.4)
which contradicts (3). Hence ISC holds for this case.
(b) f, f ′ have exactly 2 elements:
Let f = (z1, 1− p; z2, p), f ′ = (z′1, 1− p; z′2, p) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′1, z′2) ⊂
(z1, z2). Suppose that, for some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (z′1, z′2). If N satisfies RDU,
then:
f ∼N f ′ ⇒ v(z1) + w(p)[v(z2)− v(z1)] = v(z′1) + w(p)[v(z′2)− v(z′1)]
⇒ w(p) = v(z
′
1)− v(z1)
[v(z′1)− v(z1)] + [v(z2)− v(z′2)]
⇒ w(p)
1− w(p) =
v(z′1)− v(z1)
v(z2)− v(z′2)
(A.5)
Since af + (1− a)δz = ((z1, a(1− p); z, 1− a; z2, ap) and af ′ + (1− a)δz = ((z′1, a(1−
p); z, 1 − a; z′2, ap), the condition af + (1 − a)δz N af ′ + (1 − a)δz implies (using a
similar calculation to the one used for obtaining (3)) that
⇒ w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≥
v(z′1)− v(z1)
v(z2)− v(z′2)
(A.6)
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and combining (4) and (5), it follows that
⇒ w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≥
w(p)
1− w(p) (A.7)
As before, this does not depend on the v′s, but only on the weighting function w. Take
any f̃ = (z̃1, 1 − p; z̃2, p), f̃ ′ = (z̃′1, p1; z̃′2, p2) and z̃ such that z̃ ∈ (z̃′1, z̃′2) ⊂ (z̃1, z̃2).
It must be that af̃ + (1 − a)δz̃ N af̃ ′ + (1 − a)δz̃. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that
af̃ ′+(1−a)δz̃ N af̃+(1−a)δz̃. Then, redoing a similar calculation to the one above,
we obtain:
⇒ w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) <
w(p)
1− w(p) (A.8)
which contradicts (7). Hence ISC holds for this case as well, which completes the
proof.
The following lemma is used in the proof of theorem 4:
Lemma 2t. Let w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. Take any p, q, p′, p′ ∈ [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] such that p > p′ > q′,
q > q′. Then if w is concave on [p, p]:
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
if w is convex on [p, p]:
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≥
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
Proof. The proof is only shown for a concave function w. We make use of the following
well-known result that a function f is concave if and only if for any p̃ > q̃ > r̃,
f(p̃)− f(q̃)
p̃− q̃ ≤
f(p̃)− f(r̃)
p̃− r̃ ≤
f(q̃)− f(r̃)
q̃ − r̃ (A.9)
We now directly prove the claim for each of the three possible cases:
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(i) p > q > p′ > q′
Using (9) twice,
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(q)− w(p′)
q − p′ ≤
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
(ii) p > p′ > q > q′
Using (9) twice,
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(p′)− w(q)
p′ − q ≤
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
(iii) p > p′ = q > q′
In this case, the result follows immediately from (9):
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(q)− w(q′)
q − q′ =
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
which completes the proof.
Theorem 3. Proof. Suppose that N satisfies RDU. We first show (A) that the weighting
function w is concave implies that for any f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn),
f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z
′
i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1),
and for all a ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (zi, zi+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
We then prove the converse (B).
Proof of (A) Suppose that the weighting function w is concave. We proceed by contradic-
tion. There are two cases to consider:
(a) f, f ′ have more than two elements: Let f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f
′ =
(z1, p1; ...z
′
i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1).
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Suppose there exists some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (zi, zi+1) such that af ′+(1−a)δz N
af + (1− a)δz. Using the derivation of theorem 3, it follows that
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
<
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(A.10)
We now show:
(I) w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2) ≥ a
(
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
)
Note that p∗i+1 > p
∗
i+2 > ap
∗
i+2, since a ∈ (0, 1), and using the definition of p∗.
It is immediate that ap∗i+1 > ap
∗
i+2. It follows, therefore, from lemma 2t, that:
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
p∗i+1 − p∗i+2
≤ w(ap
∗
i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
ap∗i+1 − ap∗i+2
Rearranging, we obtain w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2) ≥ a
(
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
)
.
(II) w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a) ≤ a
(
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
)
Note that ap∗i + 1 − a > p∗i , since a, p∗i ∈ (0, 1) implies that 1 − a > p∗i (1 − a).
Similarly, ap∗i+1 + 1− a > p∗i+1, and we know that p∗i > p∗i+1. Using lemma 2t,
it follows that:
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
(ap∗i + 1− a)−
(
ap∗i+1 + 1− a
) ≤ w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
p∗i − p∗i+1
Rearranging, we obtain w(ap∗i +1−a)−w(ap∗i+1 +1−a) ≤ a
(
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
)
Combining (I) and (II) (noting that both sides of (II) are greater than zero), it follows
that
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
≥ w(p
∗
i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(A.11)
which is a contradiction of (10).
(b) f, f ′ have exactly 2 elements:
Let f = (z1, 1− p; z2, p), f ′ = (z′1, 1− p; z′2, p) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′1, z′2) ⊂
(z1, z2). Suppose there exists some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (z1, z2) such that af ′ +
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(1− a)δz N af + (1− a)δz. Using the derivation of theorem 3, it follows that
w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) <
w(p)
1− w(p) (A.12)
We now show:
(I) w(ap) ≥ aw(p)
a ∈ (0, 1) and so p > ap > 0. It follows from the well-known result (9) used in
proving lemma 2t that:
w(p)− w(0)
p
≤ w(ap)− w(0)
ap− 0
Using w(0) = 0 and rearranging, we obtain w(ap) ≥ aw(p)
(II) 1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≤ a (1− w(p))
Note that 1 > ap+1−a > p, since it is immediate from a, p ∈ (0, 1) that a > ap
and 1− a > p(1− a).
Using (9) again,
w(1)− w(ap+ 1− a)
1− (ap+ 1− a) ≤
w(1)− w(p)
1− p
Using w(1) = 1 and rearranging, we obtain that 1−w(ap+1−a) ≤ a (1− w(p)).
Combining (I) and (II), we obtain
w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≥
w(p)
1− w(p) (A.13)
which contradicts (12).
Proof of (B) Suppose that for any f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn),
f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z
′
i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1),
and for all a ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (zi, zi+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
We proceed as follows: (a) we first show that there is no interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] on which w
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is strictly convex; (b) we then show that there is no interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] such that for all
p ∈ [p, p], w(p) is ‘under the diagonal’, i.e. w(p)−w(p)p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p (note that
with stronger smoothness assumptions this would be sufficient for concavity); (c) we use
results (a) and (b) to prove that w must be concave. We first note that it follows from the
claim and from the derivation of theorem 3 that:
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
≥ w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
(A.14)
for all 0 ≤ p2 < p1 < p0 ≤ 1 and a ∈ (0, 1).
(a) We proceed by contradiction: suppose there does exist an interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] on
which w is strictly convex. Let p < p2 < p1 < p0 < p, and let { pp2 ,
1−p
1−p0 } < a < 1. It
follows that p < ap2 < ap1 < ap1 + 1− a < ap0 + 1− a)p. Using lemma 2t, it follows
that:
w(p1)− w(p2)
p1 − p2
>
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
ap1 − ap2
(A.15)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
(ap0 + 1− a)− (ap1 + 1− a)
>
w(p0)− w(p1)
p0 − p1
(A.16)
Rearranging and combining (15) and (16), it follows that
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
<
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
which contradicts (14).
(b) We proceed again by contradiction: suppose that there does exist an interval [p, p] ⊆
[0, 1] such that w(p)−w(p)p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p for all p ∈ [p, p].
Let a = 1 − (p − p) + ε, for an arbitrarily small ε. Let p̃ = p/a. Using result (a),
[p̃, p̃ + δ] cannot be strictly convex, for any δ ∈ (0, 1 − p̃]. We can therefore find
{p0, p1, p2} ∈ [p̃, p̃+ δ] such that p2 < p1 < p0 and
w(p1)− w(p2)
p1 − p2
≥ w(p0)− w(p1)
p0 − p1
(A.17)
As δ, ε become arbitrarily small (and aδ ≤ ε), ap2 → p, ap0 + 1 − a → p and
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{ap2, ap1, ap1 + 1 − a, ap0 + 1 − a} ∈ [p, p]. We therefore have that for small enough
δ, ε,
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
(ap0 + 1− a)− (ap1 + 1− a)
>
w(p)− w(p)
p− p (A.18)
and
w(p)− w(p)
p− p >
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
a(p1 − p2)
(A.19)
Combining (18) and (19):
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
<
p1 − p2
p0 − p1
(A.20)
Combining (17) and (20), we obtain:
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
<
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
which contradicts (14).
(c) We now prove that w is concave. Suppose not, i.e. suppose there exist 0 ≤ p < q <
r < 1 such that
w(r)− w(q)
r − q >
w(q)− w(p)
q − p (A.21)
Let a = 1 − (r − q) + ε, for an arbitrarily small ε. Let p̃ = q/a. Using result
(a), [p̃ − δ, p̃] cannot be strictly convex, for any δ ∈ (0, p̃]. We can therefore find
{p0, p1, p2} ∈ [p̃− δ, p̃] such that p2 < p1 < p0 and
w(p1)− w(p2)
p1 − p2
≥ w(p0)− w(p1)
p0 − p1
(A.22)
As δ, ε become arbitrarily small (and aδ ≤ ε), ap1 → q, ap0 + 1− a→ r, {ap2, ap1} ∈
(p, q] and {ap1 + 1− a, ap0 + 1− a} ∈ [q, r].
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Using result (b), we have can find some (small enough) δ, ε such that
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
a(p1 − p2)
≤ w(q)− w(p)
q − p (A.23)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
(ap0 + 1− a)− (ap1 + 1− a)
≥ w(r)− w(q)
r − q (A.24)
Combining (21, (23) and (24) we have
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
<
p1 − p2
p0 − p1
(A.25)
Combining (22) and (25), we have
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
<
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
which contradicts (14), and completes the proof.
Theorem 4. Suppose that axioms A.1 through A.4 and the RDU axioms hold, and let u
and v be the utility functions associated with the resolved and unresolved lotteries, respec-
tively, and w be the decision weight associated with the unresolved lotteries. In addition,
suppose that u, v are both differentiable. Then:
(i) If there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that p < w(p), then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that
δf  f . Similarly, if there exists p′ ∈ (0, 1) such that p′ > w(p′), then there exists an
f ′ ∈ L0 such that f ′  δ′f .
(ii) If  exhibits doubt-aversion, then p ≥ w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if u exhibits
stronger diminishing marginal utility than v (i.e. u = λ ◦ v for some continuous, weakly
concave, and increasing λ on v([z, z̄])), then N violates quasi-concavity. (that is, there
exists some f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ′  f ′′ and f ′′ N αf ′ + (1− α)f ′′).
Similarly, if  exhibits doubt-proneness, then p ≤ w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if v ex-
hibits stronger diminishing marginal utility than u , then N violates quasi-convexity. (that
is, there exists some f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ′  f ′′ and αf ′+ (1−α)f ′′ N
f ′).
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Proof. (i) Suppose not, i.e. suppose that there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that p < w(p), and
that f  δf for all f ∈ L0. Let fε = (z; 1−p; z+ε, p) for some z ∈ Z, p ∈ L0, 0 < ε < z̄−z.
Since f  δf , by continuity (and using the certainty axiom), there exists a z̃ε ∈ (z, z + ε)
such that f 
[
δz̃ε ∼ δδz̃ε
]
 δf . Hence:
(1− p)u(z) + pu(z + ε) ≥ u(z̃ε)
w(p) (v(z + ε)− v(z)) + v(z) ≤ v(z̃ε)
Rearranging:
p ≥ u(z̃ε)− u(z)
u(z + ε)− u(z)
w(p) ≤ v(z̃ε)− v(z)
v(z + ε)− v(z)
Hence:
u(z̃ε)− u(z)
u(z + ε)− u(z) −
v(z̃ε)− v(z)
v(z + ε)− v(z) ≤ p− w(p)
But as ε → 0, u(z̃ε)−u(z)u(z+ε)−u(z) →
u′(z)
u′(z) , and
v(z̃ε)−v(z)
v(z+ε)−v(z) →
v′(z)
v′(z) , by differentiability. Since the
left-hand-side goes to 1− 1 = 0 in the limit, while the right-hand-side does not change, it
must be that 0 ≤ p− w(p). But this is a contradiction, since p < w(p).
The second part of the result can be proved in a similar manner, for the case p′ > w(p′).
(ii) The result is only shown for doubt-aversion; a similar reasoning holds for doubt-
proneness. By the contrapositive of (i), it is immediate that if f  δf for all f ∈ L0,
then w(p) ≤ p for all p ∈ (0, 1). Now suppose that f  δf for some f, and that u is
a (weakly) concave transformation of v. If w is not concave, then N cannot be quasi-
concave, by Wakker (1994) theorem 25. Since w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, w(p) ≥ p for a concave
function. We have that w(p) ≤ p, and so it suffices to show that w(p) < p for some p.
Suppose not. That is, w(p) = p for all p. Since u is more concave than v, it must be that
u−1(EU(f)) ≤ v−1(EV (f))(that is, the certainty equivalent of f for the informed lotteries
is not bigger than the certainty equivalent of f for the unresolved lotteries, by a well known
result). However, since f  δf , it must also be that u−1(EU(f)) > v−1(EV (f)), which is
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a contradiction.
Note that if f ∼ δf for all f ∈ L0, than trivially, u is a linear transformation of v, and
w(p) = p.
Corollary 4.1. Proof. To prove (i) ⇒ (ii):If N displays mean-preserving risk-aversion,
then w(p) is convex, by Chew, Epstein and Safra (1986) or Grant, Kajii and Polak (2000).
Since w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, it must be that p ≥ w(p). Since δf  f , it follows from result
(ii) that p ≤ w(p). Hence w(p) = p, implying that N satisfies expected utility.
Since δf  f for all f ∈ L0, and both u and v are of EU form, u must be a concave
transformation of v. This is well-known, see for instance Kreps-Porteus (1978).
The other direction, (ii) ⇒ (i), is trivial: if u and v are concave then they both display
mean-preserving risk aversion by well known results, and if u is a concave transformation
of v then δf  f for all f ∈ L0.
Theorem 5.
Proof. If u(z) = v(z) for all z ∈ Z, then δf  f if and only if
u(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[u(zi)− u(zi−1)]w(p∗i ) ≥
m∑
i=1
u(zi)p(zi) (A.26)
⇔ u(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[u(zi)− u(zi−1)]w(p∗i ) ≥ u(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[u(zi)− u(zi−1)]p∗i (A.27)
⇔
m∑
i=2
[u(zi)− u(zi−1)](w(p∗i )− p∗i ) ≥ 0. (A.28)
This expression is always true if and only if w(p) ≥ p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. For the agent to be
doubt-prone, the inequality in (A.28) must be strict somewhere, hence w(p) > p for some
p ∈ (0, 1). Now suppose u = λ ◦ v for some continuous, weakly concave and increasing λ.
By theorem 4, the agent is doubt-prone everywhere only if p ≤ w(p). Now suppose that
w(p) > p. Then using the same argument as above, we have:
v(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[v(zi)− v(zi−1)]w(p∗i ) ≥
m∑
i=1
v(zi)p(zi). (A.29)
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Hence:
u
(
v−1
(
v(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[v(zi)− v(zi−1)]w(p∗i )
))
≥ u
(
v−1
(
m∑
i=1
v(zi)p(zi)
))
. (A.30)
But by concavity of u
(
v−1(·)
)
, we know that
u
(
v−1
(
m∑
i=1
v(zi)p(zi)
))
≥
m∑
i=1
u(zi)p(zi), (A.31)
with strict inequality somewhere, hence the agent is doubt-prone everywhere. This com-
pletes the proof.
Preservation of self-image. For an agent who is doubt-prone and risk-averse for both
resolved and unresolved lotteries, the following holds:
C(e) ≡ u ◦ v−1(Ev(t))−
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e)) ≥ 0
Proof. Note that u ◦ v−1(·) is concave. Hence
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e)) ≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
m
p(m|e)(Ev(t|m, e))
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
m
p(m|e)
∑
t
p(m|t, e)p(t)
p(m|e) v(t)
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
m
∑
t
p(m|t, e)p(t)v(t)
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
t
∑
m
p(m|t, e)p(t)v(t)
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
t
p(t)v(t)
)
= u ◦ v−1(Ev(t))
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Doubt-neutrality result. Proof. If (i) holds, then it is trivial that (ii) and (iii) hold as
well.
To show that (ii) ⇒ (i):
Suppose not. Then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that either f  δf or δf  f . Suppose
f  δf . Then by lemma 1, there exists an H(f) ∈ Z such that δf ∼ δH(f). By transitivity,
f  δf ⇔ f  δH(f), and so by (ii), δf  δδH(f) . By transitivity again, δH(f)  δδH(f) , but
this violates the certainty axiom A.1. Now suppose that δf  f . Then δH(f)  f , and by
(ii), δδH(f)  δf ⇔ δδH(f)  δH(f), which violates A.1.
To show that (iii) ⇒ (i):
Suppose not. Then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that either f  δf or δf  f . Suppose
that f  δf . Note that by continuity, it is also the case that there exists an H̃ ∈ Z such
that f ∼ δH̃(f). By the certainty axiom A.1, δH̃(f) ∼ δδH̃(f) . By transitivity, δδH̃(f)  δf ,
and by (iii), δH̃(f)  f . But this is a contradiction. Now suppose that δf  f . Then
δf  δδH̃(f) ⇔ f  δH̃(f) which is a contradiction.
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Appendix B
Appendix B
The appendix is structured as follows. I first present the details of the signal structure, and
then analyze the Dutch Lottery and the safe allocation bias. I then prove theorem 1 and
theorem 2. In the discussion that follows, all lotteries are ordered from best to worse; that
is, if f = (r1, p1; ...rm; pm), then r1 > ... > rm.
Signal structure
Recall that:
p∗(ri, rj |f ; f ′) ≡
∑
{r∈f,r′∈f ′}
p(r; f)p(r′; f ′)I{ur(ri)−ur(rj) > ur(r)−ur(r′)}.
p∗(ri, rj |f ; f ′) ≡
∑
{r∈f,r′∈f ′}
p(r; f)p(r′; f ′)I{ur(ri)−ur(rj) < ur(r)−ur(r′)}.
For set S, let
K−i(S) = {g ∈ Lr|g ∈M, where M ∈ S\Mi}.
This set contains all the lotteries that are not in menu Mi, but it does not specify which
menu they are from. Now suppose that g′ ia a lottery in an unchosen menu, while f is
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still the received lottery. Let α > 1. Define p∗K and p
∗
K
in an analogous way:
p∗K(ri, rj |f ; g′) ≡ (1− p(ri|f))
∑
{r∈f,r′∈g′}
p(r; f)p(r′; g′)αI{ur(ri)−ur(rj) >ur(r)−ur(r′)}.
p∗
K
(ri, rj |f ; g′) ≡ (1− p(ri|f))
∑
{r∈f,r′∈g′}
p(r; f)p(r′; g′)αI{ur(ri)−ur(rj) <ur(r)−ur(r′)}.
Weights p∗K(ri, rj |f ; f ′) and p∗K(ri, rj |f ; f
′) will be used to assess the signal over unchosen
menus. In accordance with signal property S.4, a lottery in an unchosen menu gives the
agent a less informative signal than if it were chosen, compared to if it were in a chosen
menu, unless it is degenerate. Note that if the agent receives an outcome ri|f for sure,
then since 1 − p(ri|f)) = 0, the agent obtains no information from the unchosen menu.
Let X(g) be the set of outcomes that can be reached with positive probability in g. That
is, if g = (r1, p1; ...rng , png), then X(g) = {r1, ...rng}. The signal structure, given history
H = (r1, ..., rn; fj ;M ;S), is:
p(t|H) = pt
(
1 +
∑
k∈{1..n}
bjk
(
ur(rj)− ur(rk)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rj)≥ur(rk)}(p
∗(rj , rk|fj ; fk))
−cS
∑
k′∈{1..n}
(
ur(rk′)− ur(rj)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rj)<ur(rk′ )}(p
∗(rj , rk′ |fj ; fk′)) (B.1)
+
∑
gh∈K−i(S)
∑
r̃∈X(gh)
(
ur(rj)− ur(r̃)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)[
I{ur(rj)≥ur(r̃)}bK,jh(p
∗(rj , r̃|fj ; gh))
+ I{ur(rj)<ur(r̃)}cS(p
∗(rj , r̃|fj ; gh))
])
(B.2)
The first part of the expression, (B.1), corresponds to the signal received from the chosen
menu. The second part (between (B.1) and (B.2)), corresponds to the signal received from
unchosen menus. The differences between the two are as follows. The weights p∗K and p
∗
K
associated with the unchosen menus are smaller than for the chosen menus, since unchosen
menus are less informative. In addition, since the agent does not know which outcome has
occurred, the signal uses an ex-ante viewpoint for the lotteries from unchosen menus, and
an ex-post viewpoint for the lottery whose outcome he actually receives. Finally, note
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that we are using set K−i(S), so that the agent does not take into consideration which
unchosen menu a lottery is from, or whether it is in more than one menu. I now turn
to characterizing the constants. Let N(S) be the total number of lotteries in set S. This
number is useful for ensuring that the agent’s ex-post belief is in the correct range, [0, 1]
(this number is higher than necessary, but it is convenient). Finally, let c ∈ (0, 1) be a
parameter. Again, the upper bound (1) is chosen to make sure that the ex-post belief is
within [0, 1]. The lower bound (0) is chosen to ensure that the signal goes in the desired
direction. Then:
cS =
c
N(S)−1 min{
1−pt
pt
, pt1−pt }.
Index bjk is defined to ensure that the non-manipulability assumption holds. Specifically:
bjk =
cS
∑
rl∈X(fj)
∑
rm∈X(fk)
p(rl|fj)p(rm|fk) (ur(rm)− ur(rl)) I{ur(rl)<ur(rm)}(p∗(rl, rm|fj ; fk))∑
rl′∈X(fj)
∑
rm′∈X(fk)
p(rl′ |fj)p(r′m|fk) (ur(rl′)− ur(rm′)) I{ur(rl′ )≥ur(rm′ )}(p
∗(rl′ , rm′ |fj ; fk))
(B.3)
It is clear that comparing any two lotteries f and f ′ at the ex-ante stage, the expectation
of t is still p(t). The only difference with bK,jk is that the weighting functions p
∗ and p∗
are replaced with p∗K and p
∗
K
:
bK,jk =
cS
∑
rl∈X(fj)
∑
rm∈X(fk)
p(rl|fj)p(rm|fk) (ur(rm)− ur(rl)) I{ur(rl)<ur(rm)}(p∗K(rl, rm|fj ; fk))∑
rl′∈X(fj)
∑
rm′∈X(fk)
p(rl′ |fj)p(r′m|fk) (ur(rl′)− ur(rm′)) I{ur(rl′ )≥ur(rm′ )}(p
∗
K(rl′ , rm′ |fj ; fk))
(B.4)
It is straightforward to show that the desired signal properties S.1 through S.4 hold. We
now proceed to the Dutch lottery example.
Dutch lottery example
Consider the special case of the Dutch lottery example in which f = (rh, 0.5; rl, 0.5) and
the safe lottery g = (rCE , 1), where rCE is the monetary certainty equivalent of lottery f .
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Initial Set Chosen menu Chosen lottery
Feedback: S = {{f, g}} {f, g} f
No feedback: S ′ = {{f}, {g}} {g} g
Table B.1: Dutch lottery example.
That is, ur(rCE) = 0.5ur(rh) + 0.5ur(rl). In this case, the doubt-prone agent is indifferent
between receiving f and g = (rCE , 1) in the feedback case:
First, note that u(rh) − ur(rCE) = ur(rCE) − ur(rl). Denote the parameter bjk from the
signal structure b12 if f is chosen, and b21 if g is chosen. Then:
b12 = cS
ur(rCE)− ur(rl)
ur(rh)− u(rCE)
= cS (B.5)
and similarly,
b21 = cS
ur(rh)− ur(rCE)
ur(rCE)− ur(rl)
= cS . (B.6)
Using again
u(rh)− ur(rCE) = ur(rCE)− ur(rl) (B.7)
⇒ ur(rh)− ur(rCE)
ur(r)− ur(r)
=
ur(rCE)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
, (B.8)
we obtain:
W (f, {f, g}|{{{f, g}}}) = 0.5
(
ur(rh) + ur(rl) + upt
(
pt
(
1 + 0.5cS
ur(rh)− ur(rCE)
ur(r)− ur(r)
))
+upt
(
pt
(
1− 0.5cS
ur(rh)− ur(rCE)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)))
= W (g, {f, g}|{{f, g}}).
(B.9)
The agent is therefore indifferent between the two. But now, consider the no-feedback case.
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It is immediate that lottery f is exactly as informative as in the feedback case. Hence,
W (f, {f}, {g}|{{f}, {g}}) = W (f, {f, g}|{{f, g}}) = W (g, {f, g}|{{f, g}}). (B.10)
but now, lottery g must be less informative than before, by signal property S.4. Since the
agent is doubt-prone (upt is concave), it is immediate that
W (g, {f}, {g}|{{f}, {g}}) > W (g, {f, g}|{{f, g}}). (B.11)
which implies that
W (g, {f}, {g}|{{f}, {g}}) > W (f, {f, g}|{{f, g}}). (B.12)
Hence, the doubt-prone agent who is indifferent between f and g in the feedback case strictly
prefers lottery g in the no-feedback case.
Safe allocation bias
Let fb = (rh − P, q; rl − P, 1 − q), fs = (P − rh, q;P − rl, 1 − q), and g = (0, 1).I assume
that fb and fs are correlated, so that if the agent chooses fb and rh − P occurs, then he
knows that lottery fs would have yielded P − rh. If he receives rl − P from lottery fb,
then he knows that lottery fs would have yielded lottery P − rl (and similarly he chooses
lottery fs. While this correlation is technically outside the scope of this framework, the
extension is straightforward; I assume exactly the same signal structure as before, but I do
not allow for histories in which fb yields and rh − P while fs yields P − rl, and similarly
for rl − P and P − rl. I assume that if the agent chooses g, then he does not observe
the resolution of either fb or fs. The extension to allow the correlation is immediate, but
notationally cumbersome. I denote set S = {{fb, fs}, g}, though formally this does not take
into account the correlation between fb and fs. Suppose that the possible price range is an
interval [P , P ]. The agent is risk-neutral, so that that there exists exactly one price P̂ for
which the agent would be indifferent, in the standard EU setting, between fb, fs and g.
I now show that in this framework, there is a price range [PB, PG] at which the agent
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chooses lottery g. In addition, he prefers fs for P > PG and fb for P < PB. It is clear
that for any price such that rl−P > 0, the agent always chooses fb, and that for any price
such that rh − P < 0, the agent always chooses fS. We now focus on the range of prices
for which rh − P > 0 > rl − P . For simplicity, set u(r)− u(r) = 1, this has no impact on
the result. If the agent chooses lottery fb, then his value function is:
W (fb|{fb, fs}, S) =qur(rh − P ) + (1− q)ur(rl − P )
+qupt (pt (1 + bb0(ur(rh − P )− u(0)) + bbsur((rh − P )− ur(P − rl))))
+(1− q)upt (pt (1 + c(ur(0)− ur(P − rl)) + c(ur(P − rl)− ur(rl − P )))) .
(B.13)
where bb0, bbs are the parameters associated with the comparison of rh − P from fb and 0
from g, and the comparison rh−P from fb and P − rh from fs, respectively. If he chooses
lottery fs, then his value function is:
W (fs|{fb, fs}, S) =qur(P − rh) + (1− q)ur(P − rl)
+qupt (pt (1 + bs0(u(P − rl)− u(0)) + bsbur((P − rl)− ur(rl − P ))))
+(1− q)upt (pt (1 + c(ur(0)− ur(P − rh)) + c(ur(rh − P )− ur(P − rh)))) .
(B.14)
where bs0 and bsb are the parameters associated with the comparison of P − rl from fs and
0 from g, and the comparison P − rh from fs and rh − P from fb, respectively.
Finally, the value function for choosing g is simply W (g|{g}, S) = ur(0), since the agent
acquires no new information.
Now consider again price P = P̂ , for which the agent would be indifferent, in the standard
EU model (with risk-neutrality) between fb,fs and g. That is:
qDur(rh − P̂ ) + (1− q)ur(rl − P̂ ) = u(0) = qur(P̂ − rh) + (1− q)ur(P̂ − rl). (B.15)
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By property S.4, it is clear that choosing g is less informative than either fb or g, and
since the expected utility over money is the same for each, it must be that W (g|{g}, S) >
W (fb|{fb, fs}, S) and W (g|{g}, S) > W (fb|{fb, fs}, S), at price P ∗. It is clear from ex-
pression (B.13), that W (fb|{fb, fs}, S) is decreasing in P : the expected utility over money
decreases with P, and the self-image term decreases as well, since the informativeness
increases as P increases (given our signal structure, since the difference (ur(P − rl) −
ur(rl − P )) increases, informativeness increases). As for the term W (fs|{fb, fs}, S) from
(B.14), it unambiguously increases: the expected utility over money increases with P, and
the informativeness decreases as (ur(rh − P ) − ur(P − rh)) decreases. Finally, the term
W (g|{g}, S) = ur(0), is not affected by P . Hence, there is some PG (possibly P ) such that
W (fs|{fb, fg}, S) > W (g|{g}, S) and W (fs|{fb, fg}, S) > W (fb|{fb, fg}, S) for P ≥ PG.
Using a similar reasoning for P decreasing, it follows that there is some PB (possibly (P )
such that W (fb|{fb, fg}, S) > W (g|{g}, S) and W (fb|{fb, fg}, S) > W (fs|{fb, fg}, S) for
P < PB.
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Theorem 2.1: Preference for smaller menus. Suppose that the agent is strictly doubt-
prone. Take any S = {M1,M2, ...Mn}, where M1 ⊂ M2... ⊂ Mn, and where no lottery is
degenerate. In addition, CM (M1|{Mi}) = CM (M2|{Mj}) =
... = CM (Mn|{Mn}). Then the agent strictly prefers the smallest menu M1 in S, i.e.
CS(S) = M1. Furthermore, he chooses lottery CM (M1|S) = CM (M1|{Mi}).
Proof. Assume the agent is strictly doubt-prone, so that upt is strictly concave. Since
CM (M1|S) = ...CM = (MN |S), it suffices to show that CS(fl|Mi, S) > CS(fl|Mj , S),
where Mi ⊂Mj , for any fl ∈Mi (the superscript of fl is omitted, as it is understood that
fl = f
i
l = f
j
l , where f
i
l ∈Mi and f
j
l ∈Mj). That is, it suffices to show that:
W (fl,Mi|S) > W (fl,Mj |S). (B.16)
That is,
Eur(fl) +
∑
{ri1,...rini}∈Mi
upt (p(t|H))
ni∏
h=1
p(rih|f ih) >
Eur(fl) +
∑
{rj1,...r
j
nj
}∈Mj
upt (p(t|H))
nj∏
h=1
p(rjh|f
j
h) (B.17)
Since the expected utility of fl is Eur(fl) for both, we focus on upt . The rest of the proof
will show that the expected utility (using upt) of the possible histories generated by the
larger menu Mj is less preferred than a mean preserving spread of the possible histories of
Mi. By the concavity of upt , well-known results in the literature that the EU (using upt)
of the possible histories of Mi is preferred to the EU of the possible histories of Mj .
We first consider the case for where Mj ⊂ MN (i.e. j < N , before considering the case
Mj = MN (i.e. j = N).
(a) Suppose that Mj ⊂MN . Notice that K−i(S) = K−j(S) = MN . In other words, since
it is not relevant which unchosen menu the unchosen lotteries come from, the expec-
tation of the signal that the agent receives from lotteries that are not in menu Mi is
the same as that of the signal that the agent receives from lotteries that are not in
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menu Mj . It is straightforward to show that Eupt(fl|Mi, S) = Eupt(fl|Mi, {Mi,MN}),
and similarly, Eupt(fl|Mj , S) = Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,MN}). Now consider the menu
M ′i = {f1, ...fni , fni+1}, where fni+1 ∈Mj but not in Mi. Let S′ be the set
{M1, ...Mi−1,M ′i ,Mi+1, ..MN}. Since Eupt(fl|M ′i , S′) = Eupt(fl|M ′i ,M ′i ,MN ), it suf-
fices to show that Eupt(fl|Mi, {Mi,MN}) > Eupt(fl|M ′i , {M ′i ,MN}), since we can
extend the reasoning by appending lotteries to M ′i until we obtain the set Mj , that is,
we would prove:
[Eupt(fl|Mi, {Mi,MN}) = Eupt(fl|Mi, {Mi,MN})] > Eupt(fl|M ′i , {M ′i ,MN}) >
Eupt(fl|M ′′i , {M ′′i ,MN}) > ... > [Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,MN}) = Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj , S})] .
(B.18)
We now show that Eupt(fl|M ′i , {M ′i ,MN}) > Eupt(fl|M ′i , {M ′i ,MN}). First, consider
all histories of form
H(rl|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn) = (r1, ...rl; ...rni ; fl,Mi; {Mi;MN},
where only the rl ∈ X(fl) varies, for a fixed r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn. Similarly, consider,
all histories of form
H′(rl, rn+1|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn) = (r1, ...rl; ...rni , rni+1; fl,M ′i ; {M ′i ;MN},
where this time, only the rl ∈ X(fl) and rn+1 ∈ fn+1vary, for the same fixed r1, ...rl−1, rl+1,
, ..., rn as for history H(rl|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn). Notice that for any history
H′(rl, rn+1|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn),
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p(t|H′(rl, rn+1|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn)) =
pt
(
1 +
∑
k∈{1..n+1}
blk
(
ur(rl)− ur(rk)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)≥ur(rk)}(p
∗(rl, rk|fl; fk))
−cS
∑
k′∈{1..n}
(
ur(rk′)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)<ur(rk′ )}(p
∗(rl, rk′ |fl; fk′))
+
∑
gh∈K−i(S)
∑
r̃∈X(gh)
(
ur(rl; )− ur(r̃)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)[
I{ur(rl)≥ur(r̃)}bK,lh(p
∗(rl, r̃|fl; gh))
+ I{ur(rl)<ur(r̃)}cS(p
∗(rl, r̃|fl; gh))
])
(B.19)
= pt
(
1 +
∑
k∈{1..n}
blk
(
ur(rl)− ur(rk)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)≥ur(rk)}(p
∗(rl, rk|fl; fk))
−cS
∑
k′∈{1..n}
(
ur(rk′)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)<ur(rk′ )}(p
∗(rl, rk′ |fl; fk′))
+
∑
gh∈K−i(S)
∑
r̃∈X(gh)
(
ur(rl; )− ur(r̃)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)[
I{ur(rl)≥ur(r̃)}bK,lh(p
∗(rl, r̃|fl; gh))
+ I{ur(rl)<ur(r̃)}cS(p
∗(rl, r̃|fl; gh))
])
+
bl(n+1)
(
ur(rl)− ur(r(n+1))
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)≥ur(rn+1)}(p
∗(rl, rn+1|fl; fn+1))
−cS
(
ur(rn+1)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)<ur(rn+1)}(p
∗(rl, rn+1|fl; fn+1))
= p(t|H(rl|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn)) + θ(rl, rn + 1) (B.20)
where
θ(rl, rn + 1) = bl(n+1)
(
ur(rl)− ur(r(n+1))
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)≥ur(rn+1)}(p
∗(rl, rn+1|fl; fn+1))
−cS
(
ur(rn+1)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)
I{ur(rl)<ur(rn+1)}(p
∗(rl, rn+1|fl; fn+1)).
(B.21)
This notation is used for simplicity, in that the normalization of of bl(n+1 and cS does
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depend on the number of lotteries in {M ′i ,Mn.Now, let
tv(rl) =
∑
rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(rn+1|fn+1)θ(rl, rn+1). (B.22)
By (strict) concavity of upt , it is clear that :
upt(p(t|H) + tv(rl)) >∑
rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(r|fn+1)upt(p(t|H′) =
∑
rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(rn+1|fn+1) (upt(p(t|H) + θ(rl, rn+1)) .
(B.23)
for any H and associated H’s as described above. It follows that:
∑
rl∈X(fl)
p(rl|fl)upt(p(t|H) + tv(rl)) >
∑
rl∈X(fl),rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(rl|fl)p(rn+1|fn+1)upt(p(t|H′).
(B.24)
But notice that for any H as defined above (i.e. allowing only the rl’s to vary), the
random variable associated with p(t|H) + tv(rl) is a mean preserving spread of p(t|H),
in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Diamond and Stiglitz (1973) ‘fat tail’ sense.
That is, it is clear that the mean is the same, since it means these conditions: first,
∑
rl∈X(fl)
p(rl|fl)tv(rl) = 0, (B.25)
by construction of the signal (the bj(k+1) and cS are normalized so that this holds, to
satisfy the non-manipulability assumption). Second, it is straightforward to show that
tv(rl) > tv(r̃l) if rl > r̃l (from which it also follows that tv(rl) > 0 for the maximal
rlX(fl), and tv(rl) < 0 for the minimal rl ∈ X(fl). That is, tv(rl) is positive for the
highest rl, and decreases monotonically as rl diminishes ( and crosses the 0 for some
rl). This can easily be seen from the observation that θ(rl, rn) > θ(r̃l, rn) for any rn
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and for any rl > r̃l (the formal proof is trivial), from which it follows that:
∑
rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(rn+1|fn+1)θ(rl, rn+1) >
∑
rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(rn+1|fn+1)θ(r̃l, rn+1). (B.26)
It is also clear that for any rl > r̃l and H as defined earlier,
upt (p(t|H(rl|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn))) > upt (p(t|H(r̃l|r1, ...rl−1, rl+1, ...rn))) . (B.27)
Since p(t|H) + tv(rl) is a mean preserving spread of p(t|H), in the Rothschild and
Stiglitz(1970) and Diamond and Stiglitz (1973) sense and upt is strictly concave, it
follows from their well-known results that
∑
rl∈X(fl)
p(rl|fl)upt(p(t|H)) ≥
∑
rl∈X(fl)
p(rl|fl)upt(p(t|H) + tv(rl)). (B.28)
for any H. Combining (B.24) and (B.28), we have that
∑
rl∈X(fl)
p(rl|fl)upt(p(t|H)) >
∑
rl∈X(fl),rn+1∈X(fn+1)
p(rl|fl)p(rn+1|fn+1)upt(p(t|H′).
(B.29)
for any H and associated H′. Finally, summing over all the histories H’s, it follows
from (B.29) that:
∑
{r1,...rni}∈Mi
upt (p(t|H))
ni∏
h=1
p(rih|f ih) >
∑
{r1,...rni+1}∈M
′
i
upt
(
p(t|H′)
) ni+1∏
h=1
p(rjh|f
j
h)
and so Eupt(fl|Mi, {Mi,MN}) > Eupt(fl|M ′i , {M ′i ,MN}), and as shown earlier, this
suffices to show that (B.17) holds.
(b) We now consider the case where Mj = MN . It is no longer the case K−j(S) = MN ,
instead K−j(S) = MN−1. It suffices to show that CS(fl|Mj−1, S) > CS(fl|Mj , S). It
is straightforward to show that Eupt(fl|Mj , S) = Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,Mj−1}), and as
discussed earlier, Eupt(fl|Mj−1, S) = Eupt(fl|Mj−1, {Mj−1,Mj}) (since j = N). It
therefore suffices to show that
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Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,Mj−1}) < Eupt(fl|Mj−1, {Mj−1,Mj}). (B.30)
The signal structure for lotteries in unchosen menus allows the proof of part (a) above
can easily be adapted to show that
Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,Mj−1}) < Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,Mj}). (B.31)
Using the proof of part (a) directly, it is immediate that
Eupt(fl|Mj , {Mj ,Mj}) < Eupt(fl|Mj−1, {Mj−1,Mj}). (B.32)
Combining (B.31) and (B.32), we obtain (B.30), which concludes the proof.
Theorem 2.2: Charactizerization of utility over money. Function ur can be uniquely
characterized from the agent’s choices, up to positive affine transformation.
Proof. Take any f = (rh, 0.5; rl, 0.5) and fr′ = (r
′, 1), for some r′. Consider the set
S′ = {{f, fr′}}. Let the signal structure parameter associated with choosing lottery f
from set S′ = {{f, fr′}} be b′12, and the parameter associated with choosing fr′ be b′21.
We first show that if the agent is indifferent between lottery f and lottery fr′ , then it
must be that r′ = rCE , the monetary certainty equivalent of lottery f , in the sense that
ur(rCE) = 0.5ur(rh) + 0.5ur(rl). First, recall that it was previously shown (see the Dutch
lottery example in the appendix) that the agent is indifferent between receiving f and fr′ ,
if r′ = rCE . Now, suppose that r
′ > rCE . Denote the lottery frCE = (rCE , 1), and let the
signal structure parameters associated with choosing lottery frCE from set SCE = (f, frCE )
be b21. Recall that b21 = cS , as was previously shown.
Now,
b′21 = cS
ur(r
′)− ur(rl)
ur(rh)− ur(r′)
. (B.33)
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b′21 = cS
ur(rh)− ur(r′)
ur(r′)− ur(rl)
. (B.34)
Since r′ > rCE , ur(rh)−ur(r′) < ur(rh)−ur(rCE), and ur(r′)−ur(rl) > ur(rCE)−ur(rl).
Hence b′21 < [b21 − cS ]. Now,
W (f, {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) = 0.5
(
ur(rh) + ur(rl) + upt
(
pt
(
1 + 0.5cS
ur(r
′)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
))
+upt
(
pt
(
1− 0.5cS
ur(r
′)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)))
(B.35)
and
W (fr′ , {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) = ur(r′) + 0.5
(
upt
(
pt
(
1 + 0.5cS
ur(rh)− ur(r′)
ur(r)− ur(r)
))
+upt
(
pt
(
1− 0.5cS
ur(rh)− ur(r′)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)))
. (B.36)
Since rCE < r
′ by assumption, it must be that
[0.5(ur(rh) + ur(rl)) = ur(rCE)] < ur(r
′). (B.37)
Focusing on the upt terms, notice that both (B.35) and (B.36) have the same expected
value of the term inside the function, pt. It also the case that
ur(r
′)− ur(rl) > [ur(rCE)− ur(rl) = ur(rh)− ur(rCE)] > ur(rh)− ur(r′). (B.38)
Hence, using a standard mean preserving spread argument,
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0.5
(
upt
(
pt
(
1 + 0.5cS
ur(r
′)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
))
+ upt
(
pt
(
1− 0.5cS
ur(r
′)− ur(rl)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)))
<
0.5
(
upt
(
pt
(
1 + 0.5cS
ur(rh)− ur(r′)
ur(r)− ur(r)
))
+ upt
(
pt
(
1− 0.5cS
ur(rh)− ur(r′)
ur(r)− ur(r)
)))
.
(B.39)
Combining (B.37) and (B.39), it must be that
W (f, {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) < W (f, {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) if r′ > rCE . Using a similar argument,
it must also be the case that W (f, {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) > W (fr′ , {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}). There-
fore, since W (f, {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) = W (f, {f, fr′}|{{f, fr′}}) when r = rCE , the agent is
indifferent between f and fr′ if and only if r
′ = rCE . Furthermore, we know that if the
agent prefers f ′r to f in set S
′, then r′ > rCE ; similarly, if the agent prefers f to fr′ , then
r′ < rCE .
We now use an algorithm for finding the value of ur(r) for any r ∈ [r, r], noting first that
ur is unique up to positive affine transformation. (Of course, upt responds accordingly;
that is, ur(r) + upt(pt) is unique up to positive affine transformation, so that for function
ũr(r)+ũpt(pt), if ũr = aur(.)+b for some a > 0 and b, then it must be that ũpt(.) = aupt(.),
for the same a.) We arbitrarily choose ur(r) = ur, and ur(r) = ur, where ur < ur ∈ R.
The algorithm is as follows:
Let r1 = r, r1 = r, and f1 = (0.5, r1; 0.5, r1), and let rCE,1 be the value such that the agent
is indifferent between f1 and frCE,1 in set S1 = {{f, frCE,1}}, i.e. CM ({f, frCE,1}|S1) =
{f, frCE,1}. Let L > 1 be an integer. We now use the following ‘for’ loop. Note that
ur(rCE,1 = 0.5ur + 0.5ur, as shown above.
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For j = 1 to L (incrementing j by 1 at each loop),
begin
if rCE,j = r, then
let u(r) = ur(rCE,j), and exit the loop.
else if rCE,j < r then
let rj+1 = rj ,
let rj+1 = rCE,j ,
else (i.e., if rCE,j > r),
let rj+1 = rCE,j ,
let rj+1 = rj ,
endif
let fj+1 = (0.5, rj+1, 0.5, rj+1),
let rCE,j be the value such that the agent is indifferent between fj and
frCE,j in set Sj = {{f, frCE,j}}, implying that ur(rCE,j) = 0.5ur(rj) + 0.5ur(rj).
end loop.
If this program does produce a value for ur(r), then this concludes the proof. Otherwise,
since ur is continuous in [r, r], the series ur(rCE,j) converges to ur(r), as L goes to infinity.
Since ur(r) is the limit of this series, this concludes the proof.
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